Elliott v Law Society of England & Wales

An extension of time for a statutory appeal requires consideration of both the reasons for delay and whether justice and fairness justify relief despite it. A solicitor who consciously chooses one remedial route instead of an available statutory appeal cannot normally rely on legal advice, funding difficulties or personal problems to explain very substantial delay. The court must also consider the public interest in the expeditious resolution of professional disciplinary proceedings. Permitting an appeal years out of time, after another challenge has failed, may defeat the purpose of a short statutory time limit. The court may determine the limitation issue first and dismiss the appeal without deciding its merits.

The claimant, a solicitor, was struck off by the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal after disciplinary proceedings in which he withdrew when an adjournment was refused. He did not bring the statutory appeal under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974 within the applicable 14-day period.

He instead sought a rehearing under Rule 25 of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 1995 and later judicial review of the Tribunal’s refusal to rehear the matter. Leveson J dismissed that application. The claimant then issued the present statutory appeal more than two years out of time. The central issue was whether time should be extended.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court refused an extension of time and dismissed the statutory appeal without hearing submissions on the merits.
2. Under CPR Part 3, the court had to consider, first, the reasons for the delay and, secondly, whether justice and fairness required an extension despite the delay.
3. The delay was approximately two years and three months beyond the 14-day period. No good or reasonable explanation had been established. Although failures caused by legal representatives had to be considered under CPR rule 3.9, the claimant was himself a solicitor and had made conscious decisions to pursue a rehearing and judicial review instead of the statutory appeal. The statutory appeal had plainly been considered and rejected as a course of action.
4. Justice and fairness did not require an extension. The claimant was seeking to relitigate his grievance by a different route after choosing not to use the statutory appeal. The court had to take account not only of his hardship but also of the interests of the public, the Law Society, other solicitors and their clients in the prompt disposal of disciplinary proceedings.
5. Allowing the appeal would make a mockery of the short time limit imposed by Order 106 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. The court therefore refused the extension and dismissed the appeal forthwith.
6. Costs were summarily assessed in favour of the Law Society at £19,000.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Leveson J dismissed the claimant’s judicial review application, holding that the Tribunal had correctly construed Rule 25.
• Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal: The Tribunal found nearly all the disciplinary allegations proved and made a striking-off order. It refused the claimant’s later application for a rehearing.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The present court refused an extension of time and dismissed the statutory appeal.