Nakalanzi, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Where an applicant cannot satisfy the Immigration Rules, an Article 8 claim can succeed only where the facts are truly exceptional and proportionality imperatively requires a favourable outcome. The Rules generally reflect the required balance between immigration control and private or family life.

Immigration history is relevant, although not determinative. A claimant cannot rely on difficulties in obtaining entry clearance that arise from failure to comply with the Rules, since that would allow the claimant to benefit from their own wrong and undermine effective immigration control.

The claimant sought judicial review of removal directions to Uganda. Her original asylum and Article 8 claims had been rejected after the adjudicator and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal disbelieved material parts of her account and found no protected family life.

She advanced a fresh Article 8 case based on a relationship with Mr Kironde, their child, and Mr Kironde’s daughter, who had come to the United Kingdom after her mother’s death. The issue was whether, accepting the claimant’s case at its highest, removal could arguably be disproportionate despite her inability to succeed under the Immigration Rules.

1. Application refused. The court considered the claimant’s Article 8 case on the most favourable factual assumptions reasonably available, while recognising the substantial inconsistencies in her evidence.
2. The court applied the guidance in Huang & others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 105. An Article 8 claim outside the Rules succeeds only where the case is truly exceptional and the imperative of proportionality requires an outcome in the claimant’s favour. The Rules generally embody the necessary balance between private or family life and immigration control.
3. The claimant’s immigration history was relevant, although not determinative. On the assumptions most favourable to her, the relationship with Mr Kironde was brief and began when both parties knew that her immigration status was precarious. The family relationship was therefore insufficient to make removal disproportionate.
4. The claimant could not rely on the possibility that she might be unable to obtain entry clearance because she could not satisfy the Rules. Allowing that argument would permit a person to benefit from their own wrong and would undermine the effective operation of immigration control. The possibility of support from Mr Kironde’s extended family was also a relevant consideration for the entry-clearance process.
5. There was no arguable basis on which an adjudicator could conclude that removal breached Article 8. The application was refused. The claimant was given seven days to provide a legal-aid certificate for detailed assessment.