Vekariya, R (on the application of) v Deputy British High Commission, Mumbai, India

Delay in processing a first British passport application is unlawful only where it is so extreme and unjustified that it exceeds maladministration and becomes unlawful delay. The assessment must compare like with like. Processing times in India may properly be longer than those for applications handled by the United Kingdom Passport Service because identity, nationality and supporting documents may require extensive investigation and verification.

An application may lawfully be lapsed where insufficient information has been provided, rather than refused. The applicant may challenge the legality of either decision by judicial review. The relevant threshold is whether any reasonable properly directed official would have accepted that sufficient information had been supplied.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Deputy British High Commission’s handling of his application for a British passport. He alleged that the application, first made in 2000 and followed by further applications after earlier applications had been lapsed, had been subject to unlawful delay.

The defendant explained that first passport applications in India required detailed evidence of identity, nationality and family circumstances, with possible interviews and verification by local authorities. The claimant’s latest application was received in July 2004. The central issues were whether the delay was unlawful and whether the use of a lapsing procedure, rather than refusal, was lawful.

1. The application was refused. The delay in dealing with the claimant’s latest passport application was adequately explained by the complexity of establishing identity, British nationality, the claimant’s date of birth and his parents’ marriage, together with the need for interviews and document verification.
2. The court had to compare like with like. The United Kingdom Passport Service’s guideline period of three weeks could not be applied directly to first passport applications in India. The evidential and administrative circumstances were materially different, including the reliability of public records, the prevalence of fraud, the age of relevant documents and the need for local verification. The three-week period was itself only a guideline and was subject to the provision of complete and sufficient information.
3. There was nothing unlawful in the defendant’s administrative practice of lapsing an application where insufficient information had been provided, while refusing an application where the information supplied indicated that the applicant was not entitled to a passport. The claimant’s earlier decisions to lapse his applications were in any event too late to challenge in these proceedings.
4. There was no appeal on the merits against a decision to lapse or refuse a passport application. Judicial review remained available to challenge legality. Where the complaint was that sufficient documentary evidence had been provided, the relevant question was whether any reasonable official, properly directing himself or herself, would have accepted that the claim had been established.
5. The delay had to be more than mere maladministration. It had to be so extreme and unjustified as to be unlawful. On the evidence, the delay was not even maladministration, still less unlawful delay.

The claimant was entitled to seek prompt judicial review of any error of law in a decision to lapse or refuse the application for inadequate information.