Hill & Anor v Transport for London

Part II of Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act 1980 provides a complete code for limitation where the claimant derives title through the Crown. The Crown’s successor receives the benefit of either the Crown’s 30-year limitation period or the alternative 12-year period running from acquisition by a non-Crown successor, whichever expires first. This applies whether the right of action originally accrued to the Crown or to its predecessor. The word “first” in paragraph 12 therefore means earlier or previously, rather than originally. A successor’s title is not retrospectively extinguished merely because adverse possession began before the Crown acquired the land.

The claimants claimed compensation arising from their alleged adverse possession of land beneath and between arches supporting a flyover. The land had been owned by the GLC, then by the Crown, and was purportedly vested in Transport for London on 3 July 2000. The claimants contended that their prior adverse possession had extinguished the title at the moment of vesting.

The central issue was whether paragraph 12 of Part II of Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act 1980 protected Transport for London as a successor claiming through the Crown. The court also considered whether the claimants had proved adverse possession before the Crown acquired title.

1. Claim dismissed. The claimants could not establish a title capable of supporting their compensation claim against Transport for London.
2. Part II of Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act 1980 was a complete code for claims brought by persons claiming through the Crown. Paragraph 10 gave the Crown a 30-year limitation period from the date on which the right of action originally accrued, whether that right accrued to the Crown or to a predecessor.
3. Paragraph 12 gave a Crown successor the benefit of that 30-year period or the alternative period under paragraph 12(b), namely 12 years from the relevant acquisition by a person other than the Crown, whichever expired first. The word “first” in the phrase “first accrued to the Crown” meant earlier or previously, not originally. There was no rational basis for limiting paragraph 12 to cases in which the right of action originally accrued to the Crown.
4. The decision in Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs v Tomlin and Others, The Times, 4 December 1990, illustrated that the Crown enjoyed the extended limitation period even when claiming as successor to the owner to whom the right of action had first accrued.
5. Alternatively, the factual case failed. The claimants proved adverse possession from some time in 1987, and the inspections conducted in 1987, 1993 and 1995 did not interrupt that possession. However, they failed to prove possession before 1 April 1986, when the land vested in the Crown. Their inconsistent evidence, absence of corroboration and lack of evidence of early lettings meant that the alleged pre-Crown possession was not established.
6. The court considered that bricking up access, concreting, rewiring and fitting doors did not, on the evidence, establish adverse possession before 1 April 1986.

Not stated in the judgment.