Sharman, R (on the application of) v HM Coroner for Inner North London

A coroner must act as a filter to prevent an unsafe verdict being left to a jury. For unlawful killing, the question is whether the evidence could safely enable a properly directed jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the fatal force was not used in the honest belief, however mistaken, that it was necessary to meet an imminent threat. Rejecting or disbelieving an officer’s detailed account does not, without more, prove the absence of that belief. A coroner’s summing-up must identify clearly the factual findings required for a serious verdict, particularly one carrying the practical implications of a finding of criminal conduct. The verdict was quashed because the evidence did not safely support leaving unlawful killing to the jury and because the directions did not adequately explain the necessary reasoning.

The claimant, a police officer who fired the fatal shot during an armed response to a report of a man carrying a sawn-off shotgun, sought judicial review of a second inquest verdict of unlawful killing. The first inquisition had previously been quashed and a fresh inquest had resulted in the impugned verdict. The claimant argued that the evidence could not safely support unlawful killing and that the coroner’s summing-up was defective.

The central issues were the proper threshold for leaving unlawful killing to a coroner’s jury, the effect of evidence undermining the officers’ account of events, and whether the directions sufficiently explained the findings required for the verdict.

1. Applicable threshold. The coroner’s duty is similar to the criminal Galbraith approach. The coroner must withdraw a verdict where the evidence is so weak, vague or inconsistent that it would be unsafe for a properly directed jury to return it. The coroner’s broader discretion identified in Douglas-Williams concerns selecting realistically available verdicts within the evidence; it does not permit withdrawal of a verdict merely because the coroner prefers another evaluation of the facts.
2. Meaning of the possible verdicts. In this case, unlawful killing required the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the firearm was not discharged in the honest belief that an officer faced an imminent threat of being shot with a sawn-off shotgun. Lawful killing depended on proof, on the balance of probabilities, that the officer held that belief, even if mistaken. An open verdict remained available where the jury rejected the possibility of that belief but could not exclude its absence beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Evidence. The forensic and other evidence could support rejection of the officers’ precise description of Mr Stanley’s movements, and possibly their honesty about that description. It did not, however, safely exclude the realistic possibility that they honestly believed they were under imminent threat. Subsequent fabrication, even if established, did not logically disprove an earlier honest belief. The circumstances of the rapid armed response, the officers’ exposure, and their simultaneous firing were important context.
4. Directions. A coroner’s summing-up need not be analysed as closely as a criminal trial summing-up, but it must clearly identify the facts necessary for a verdict of unlawful killing. The correction that the jury could reject the officers’ accounts did not cure the failure to distinguish general credibility from the decisive question of honest belief in imminent danger.
5. Order. The verdict of unlawful killing was quashed. The narrative part of the inquisition recording the time, place and circumstances of the fatal injuries remained in force. No further inquest was ordered.

This was a first-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The court quashed the unlawful-killing verdict from the second inquest and left the narrative findings concerning the fatal injuries in place.