Director of Public Prosecutions, R (on the application of) v Sharma

In an appeal by way of case stated concerning special reasons after a drink-driving conviction, the reviewing court should not interfere merely because the magistrates’ factual conclusions appear surprising. The driver must establish, on admissible and relevant evidence, that the drink was laced without her knowledge, that she would not otherwise have exceeded the prescribed limit, and that she was unaware of the additional alcohol’s impact. Expert evidence may assist, but the guidance is not a rigid statement of law and each case depends on its facts. Erratic driving may provide cogent evidence of awareness of impairment. Carelessness is relevant only if it contributed causally to the driver’s condition.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated against the decision of the Ealing Justices on 16 August 2004. The Justices found that Ratika Sharma had driven with excess alcohol but had unknowingly consumed additional vodka added to two drinks. They concluded that special reasons existed not to impose the otherwise applicable 12-month disqualification.

The Justices also found that her driving was not impaired, that she did not know of the additional vodka, and that she would have been below the legal limit without it. The central issues were whether those findings were legally perverse and whether, on the findings, special reasons had been established.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Justices’ factual findings were surprising but were supported by the evidence and were findings to which they were entitled to come. They were not legally perverse, and the reviewing judge was not entitled to substitute his own assessment of the facts.
2. The guidance in DPP v O’Connor and Chapman and Others [1992] RTR 66 should not be treated as a rigid statutory or legal formula. Each case turns on its own facts. A driver relying on a laced drink must ordinarily establish that the drink was laced, that she did not know or suspect this, and that without the additional alcohol she would not have exceeded the prescribed limit. Expert evidence will often be required, and may affect the assessment of the driver’s credibility.
3. The driver must also demonstrate unawareness of the additional alcohol’s impact. Erratic driving may be cogent evidence that the driver was, or should have been, aware of that impact. Here, the Justices found no erratic driving, relying on the evidence of the police officers and the other evidence before them.
4. Any possible carelessness in leaving the drink unattended was irrelevant on the facts found. The additional alcohol had been added when the drinks were supplied, so the respondent’s conduct was not causative of the condition in which she was stopped.

The Justices had broadly applied the relevant guidance, found the necessary facts, and reached a conclusion which was not wrong in law.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by way of case stated against the Ealing Justices’ decision of 16 August 2004 was dismissed.