Wiggins, R (on the application of) v Harrow Crown Court

Judicial review of a Crown Court bail decision is a strict and exceptional review, not a rehearing. The High Court asks whether the decision fell outside the reasonable bounds available to the Crown Court judge. Under the Bail Act 1976, bail is generally to be granted unless a statutory exception applies. Where a defendant has failed to surrender without reasonable cause, Schedule 1 paragraph 6 reverses the usual position: bail may not be granted unless the court is satisfied that there is no significant risk of a further failure. The decision must nevertheless remain proportionate and founded on evidence. A single unexplained late attendance, against a history of compliance and in a relatively less serious case, did not justify the asserted risk.

The claimant faced trial at Harrow Crown Court for affray and firearm-related offences. He had previously complied with his bail conditions and attended earlier hearings. On the day fixed for trial he arrived about 105 minutes late, after apparently overlooking the hearing. The Crown Court remanded him in custody and later refused renewed bail, despite an offered security. The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that the Crown Court had misapplied the statutory scheme and Article 5 of the Convention. The central issues were the scope of High Court review, the effect of an apparent failure to surrender under Schedule 1 paragraph 6 of the Bail Act 1976, and whether the refusal was reasonable and proportionate.

1. The application for judicial review was granted. The refusal of bail was quashed and the matter was remitted to Harrow Crown Court for bail to be reconsidered, subject to appropriate conditions.

2. The High Court retains jurisdiction to review a Crown Court refusal of bail, but intervention is confined to exceptional cases. Applying the approach in M v Isleworth Crown Court [2005] EWHC 363 (Admin) and The Queen on the Application of Shergill v Harrow Crown Court [2005] EWHC 2005 (Admin), the review is strict and robust, but is not an appeal or a decision afresh. The question is whether the decision was outside the reasonable bounds available to the Crown Court judge.

3. Article 5 requires deprivation of liberty to be justified and proportionate. That principle is reflected in the statutory presumption in favour of bail. Section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 provides for bail unless an exception applies. Schedule 1 paragraph 6 is materially different from paragraph 2: where an adult appears to have failed to surrender without reasonable cause, bail may not be granted unless the court is satisfied that there is no significant risk of further failure.

4. Section 2(2) defines surrender by reference to the time and place appointed for attendance. The claimant therefore appeared to fall within paragraph 6. The Crown Court was entitled to find that forgetting the hearing was not reasonable cause. It nevertheless had to assess the evidence of future risk in the context of all the circumstances, including the claimant’s previous compliance, the seriousness of the offences, the prosecution’s position and the proposed security.

5. The Crown Court judge’s inference that the claimant would fail to attend whenever he felt like doing so was unsupported by sufficient evidence. One late attendance, although serious, did not rationally establish a significant future risk. The refusal of bail was therefore unreasonable and disproportionate. The High Court did not direct the grant of bail, but required prompt reconsideration unless another good reason had arisen.

This was an application for judicial review of a refusal of bail by Her Honour Judge Freedman at Harrow Crown Court. The High Court granted permission, treated the matter as the substantive hearing, quashed the refusal and remitted the bail decision to the Crown Court.