Ashton & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Chief Constable of West Yorkshire

Disciplinary proceedings against police officers should proceed where there is a reasonable prima facie case, even though the underlying criminal prosecution has been stayed for abuse of process. A stay of criminal proceedings does not determine the merits of related disciplinary allegations. The court should avoid findings which may prejudice the future disciplinary tribunal.

Regulation 9 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 1999 is engaged only after a decision has been made to appoint an investigating officer. Investigators may obtain clarification before serving a notice, particularly where doing so is necessary to assess whether a complaint warrants investigation and to avoid impeding an existing prosecution. Suspension may properly continue where serious allegations, including dishonesty, remain outstanding.

The claimants were police officers who had arrested and prosecuted Stoner under the Public Order Act 1986. After the prosecution was abandoned, they were themselves prosecuted for attempting to pervert the course of justice. The Bradford Crown Court stayed that prosecution on the ground that a fair trial was no longer possible and that the court’s processes might have been manipulated.

The claimants then sought judicial review of the continuation of disciplinary proceedings and of their suspensions. They alleged bad faith, misuse of process and unfairness, including the failure to serve Regulation 9 notices before further information was obtained. The central issues were whether the criminal stay prevented disciplinary proceedings from continuing and whether the investigative and suspension decisions were unlawful.

1. Claims dismissed. The evidence did not establish bad faith, misuse of the disciplinary system or unfairness. The criminal proceedings had been stayed because of the material before the Crown Court, but that decision did not resolve whether the disciplinary allegations were made out.
2. The defendant’s officers were entitled to investigate whether the claimants had unlawfully arrested Stoner and fabricated evidence supporting the arrest and the charge under sections 4 and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. There was a reasonable prima facie case warranting disciplinary charges. The court deliberately avoided detailed findings which might affect the future disciplinary hearing.
3. Under regulation 9 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 1999, notice is required once a decision has been made to appoint an investigating officer. That decision need not be made until the supervising officer is satisfied that there is a matter properly requiring investigation. It was therefore lawful to seek clarification about the video evidence before serving notices.
4. The discontinuance of the prosecution against Stoner was plainly the proper decision once the video and other material had been considered. That did not make the subsequent disciplinary investigation unlawful. The decision to arrest the claimants, defer the notices until arrest, and suspend them was reasonable in the circumstances, including the perceived risk of collusion and the seriousness of the allegations.
5. The continuing suspensions were not unlawful. The court noted that the documentation concerning renewal was inadequate and that reasons for suspension should be recorded and made available to the officer on request. It was arguable that suspension might engage article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but that issue did not require determination.

The judgment states that the criminal prosecution of the claimants had previously been stayed by HH Judge Gullick at Bradford Crown Court. This High Court judicial review was heard at first instance and both claims were dismissed.