Ghebru v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Where an asylum appeal is likely to be conceded, the respondent’s advisers should consider the merits promptly after permission to appeal is granted and notify the court in good time. Late consent orders disrupt the Court of Appeal’s list, waste judicial and administrative resources, and delay other appeals. A relaxation of the time for filing a skeleton argument does not remove that earlier responsibility.

The appellant appealed from a determination dated 7 December 2005 made by a single immigration judge on reconsideration of her appeal against refusal of asylum. Permission to appeal was granted on 20 January 2006, and the notice of appeal was filed on 9 February 2006.

Two days before the hearing, the Secretary of State consented to an order allowing the appeal, quashing the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal’s decision, and remitting the matter for reconsideration. The Court of Appeal retained the case in the list to address the recurrent problem of late notification of proposed consent orders in asylum appeals.

1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed by consent. The determination of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal was quashed, and the matter was remitted to a different immigration judge for reconsideration in accordance with Senior Immigration Judge Lane’s order dated 26 May 2005.
2. Procedural responsibility. Respondent advisers should consider the merits of an asylum appeal at the earlier stage when deciding whether to file a respondent’s notice and whether to add documents to the appeal bundle. That assessment should enable the respondent to notify the Civil Appeals Office promptly if the appeal will not be resisted.
3. Effect of the Practice Direction. The revised Practice Direction to CPR Part 52 relaxed the time for filing a respondent’s skeleton argument where no respondent’s notice was filed. It did not absolve the respondent’s advisers from considering the merits at the earlier stage, or from avoiding unnecessary expense and disruption.
4. Administration of justice. Late notification of consent orders caused hearings to be wasted and prevented other appeals from being listed. The court expressed the hope that the Home Office would decide earlier whether to resist appeals, particularly given the policy of speeding the consideration of asylum appeals.

Lord Justice Laws and Lady Justice Smith agreed with Lord Justice Brooke’s judgment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal allowed by consent; the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal’s determination was quashed and the matter remitted to a different immigration judge for reconsideration in accordance with Senior Immigration Judge Lane’s order dated 26 May 2005.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: determination dated 7 December 2005 on reconsideration of the appellant’s asylum appeal.