Attorney General v Perotti

A civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 may be imposed where a litigant has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or made vexatious applications without reasonable ground. Existing civil restraint orders do not necessarily make such an order unnecessary, particularly where they have not prevented continued unreasonable litigation or are due to expire. The court may consider the litigant’s wider history, including breaches of court orders and unfulfilled assurances. A penal notice is appropriate where that history demonstrates a need for effective restraint. Unrelated applications seeking prosecution of alleged offenders may be rejected where they lack reasonable grounds.

The Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for a civil proceedings order against Angelo Perotti. The Administrative Court, comprising Rix LJ and Tugendhat J, made the order on 6 April 2006 and refused permission to appeal.

Mr Perotti had pursued extensive and repetitive litigation arising from disputes concerning his uncle’s estate. Earlier civil restraint orders had not prevented further unreasonable litigation and were shortly to expire. During the section 42 proceedings he made 14 applications seeking the prosecution of alleged offenders. He argued that the order was unnecessary, unfair and punitive, and that he should receive a further opportunity to demonstrate compliance. The issue was whether there was any arguable basis for appellate intervention.

1. Application refused. Waller LJ, with Jacob LJ agreeing, held that there was no prospect of the Court of Appeal taking a different view from the Administrative Court. The section 42 order was unassailable.
2. The Administrative Court had correctly found that Mr Perotti’s litigation had become habitual and persistent, and that he had instituted vexatious civil proceedings and made vexatious applications without reasonable ground. The history included repeated attempts to relitigate, numerous actions against persons involved in earlier litigation, contempt of court and successive restraining orders. The court was entitled to conclude that a section 42 order was necessary.
3. Existing civil restraint orders did not make a section 42 order unnecessary. They had not stopped all unreasonable litigation, including litigation in which Mr Perotti was a defendant, or his attempts to invoke the criminal law. Their imminent expiry justified replacing them with a section 42 order and avoiding uncertainty about their scope.
4. The Administrative Court was entitled to reject the 14 applications seeking prosecution of alleged offenders. They appeared to lack any reasonable ground and were not matters requiring determination on the section 42 application.
5. The challenge to the penal notice failed. In light of the history, there was every reason to include it, and it would be most unusual not to do so. The complaints of unfairness, lack of legal representation and alleged misdirection disclosed no arguable error. The court was under no obligation to provide legal assistance to an experienced litigant who had adequate time to prepare.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal from the Administrative Court’s order of 6 April 2006 was refused.
• Administrative Court: Rix LJ and Tugendhat J made a civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and refused permission to appeal.