A (A Child)

In an urgent child case, substantial delay in filing an appeal requires a really good explanation before time will be extended, particularly where delay conflicts with the child’s welfare and risks frustrating timely arrangements. On the merits, an appellate court asks whether the first-instance judge balanced the relevant factors, considered the necessary matters, directed himself correctly in law and reached a conclusion open on the evidence. It must not substitute its own assessment merely because the case is finely balanced. A parent’s rehabilitation and present commitment remain relevant, but they do not erase past conduct or eliminate an objectively assessed risk to the child. Separation and a care order may therefore be justified where the child’s welfare requires security and stability outside the natural family.

Miss A sought permission to appeal against a care order made on 4 November 2005 by Mr Peter Jackson QC, sitting as a deputy judge in the Principal Registry Family Division. The proceedings concerned her four-year-old son, T. The application was made approximately six months after the written judgment was available. By the time of the application, a placement order had been made and adoptive parents were being sought.

The central issues were whether time should be extended, whether the first-instance welfare evaluation was legally or evidentially flawed, and whether the child’s strong relationship with his mother required a different outcome.

Disposition. The Court of Appeal refused the application for an extension of time and refused permission to appeal. Lord Justice Thorpe agreed with Lord Justice Wall’s reasons and written reasons.

1. In an urgent child case, a delay of more than six months in filing an appellant’s notice was unacceptable. Without a really good explanation, extending time would be contrary to the justice of the case and the interests of the child. Delay also created practical difficulties because the child’s placement and future arrangements had progressed.
2. The appellate question was whether the deputy judge had balanced the relevant factors, taken every necessary consideration into account, directed himself appropriately in law and reached a conclusion permissible and open to him on the facts. The court was not required to decide how it would have determined the case itself.
3. The deputy judge had properly recognised the child’s strong relationship with his mother and the principle that a child should be brought up by a parent unless welfare required separation. He had nevertheless considered the mother’s past drug addiction, the history of violence and instability, the continuing relationship with the father, the expert evidence and the risks associated with returning the child to her care.
4. The mother’s substantial efforts at rehabilitation and her devotion to the child did not remove the risks identified by the judge or erase the significance of her past conduct. The judge was entitled to conclude that the child required security and stability through a care order leading to adoption. His conclusion was not perverse and had ample evidential support. Any appeal would have had no reasonable prospect of success.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Refused an extension of time and refused permission to appeal.
• Principal Registry Family Division: On 4 November 2005, Mr Peter Jackson QC, sitting as a deputy judge, made a care order concerning the child.