Plant v Service Direct (UK)

Wrongful interference with goods under the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 requires goods recognised by common law. Section 14(1) excludes things in action and money. Electronic copies stored on a third party’s computer remain the third party’s copies, even where they reproduce documents supplied by another person and contractual rights require access to them. Refusal to provide access therefore does not amount to interference with the claimant’s goods where the claimant lacks a proprietary interest or immediate right to possession in the copies. The court left open whether a domain name or rights in it may be a thing in action.

The claimant had arrangements enabling him to use an internet domain name and associated email address through the defendant. After refusing demands for payment, he moved to another service provider and sought transfer of the domain-name arrangements. The defendant withheld consent to the transfer pending payment.

The claimant brought a claim solely under the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, arguing that electronic information held by a third party was equivalent to a document in a locker and that refusal of access constituted wrongful interference. Following judgment by Recorder Claire Miskin in Southampton County Court, he sought permission to appeal. The central issue was whether the electronic copies held on the third party’s computer were his goods.

The application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. The Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 is confined to goods as understood at common law, including the subject matter of conversion and trespass to goods. Section 14(1) includes chattels personal but excludes things in action and money.
2. Copies of documents stored on a third party’s computer were not the claimant’s goods merely because they reproduced documents supplied by him. They were copies maintained on the third party’s computer. The claimant had no proprietary right in the computer or its memory, and any right to obtain copies arose contractually.
3. Accordingly, refusal by the defendant to provide the key or consent needed to transfer the domain-name service did not constitute wrongful interference with the claimant’s goods. The claim had no reasonable prospect of success.
4. The court did not decide whether an internet domain name or rights in it might constitute a thing in action. That issue was immaterial because the claim, as developed, relied on the electronic copies being documents and goods.

Order: application refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Jacob refused permission to appeal, holding that the claim under the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 had no reasonable prospect of success.
• Southampton County Court: judgment of Recorder Claire Miskin, from which permission to appeal was sought; no citation or result is stated.