B (a child) , Re

On an application for permission to appeal, an appeal should proceed where the proposed ground raises an arguable question requiring consideration. A delay in filing may be excused where the explanation adequately accounts for the lateness. The court may refuse permission where a complaint is misconceived, seeks to challenge an earlier order not covered by the notice, is wholly technical or arid, or identifies no error capable of appellate intervention. In family proceedings, the absence of an express reference to the Children Act 1989 welfare checklist does not itself establish error, although the child’s welfare must remain the foundation of the decision.

The father sought permission to appeal against an order of Mr Recorder Maxwell QC in the Chesterfield County Court which reduced his overnight contact with his 11-year-old daughter from slightly more than 104 nights per year to about 93. The reduction also removed the child-support discount associated with 104 nights’ contact.

The father filed his Appellant’s Notice 18 days late. He advanced nine grounds, including alleged judicial lack of jurisdiction, procedural defects, bias, failure to apply the child-welfare checklist, and breaches of Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention 1950. Wall LJ adjourned the permission application on the child-support issue, identified as ground 6, and expressed doubts about or rejected the remaining grounds.

1. Disposition. The court extended time for filing the application, granted permission to appeal on ground 6, and refused permission on the other eight grounds. Judgment on the child-support issue was reserved.
2. Arguability and delay. The father’s explanation for filing 18 days late adequately accounted for the delay. Ground 6 raised an arguable question: the order reducing contact below 104 nights per year had caused the loss of the child-support discount, and the recorder had not addressed that financial consequence in his judgment. The court therefore required time to consider whether that consequence was legally relevant to the contact decision.
3. Jurisdiction and directions. The recorder had the necessary ticket and training to hear private family-law proceedings. The complaint about directions given by a deputy district judge was not properly brought by the notice, was substantially out of time, and concerned anodyne directions which had been acted upon.
4. Procedure and welfare. Form C2 was appropriate for the mother’s cross-application because existing family proceedings continued under an order made until further order, and the father’s application for a penal notice remained undisposed of. Even if Form C1 had been required, the objection was technical and arid. The recorder’s decision had a child-centred foundation, supported by the child’s views and the CAFCASS evidence. Failure expressly to refer to the checklist in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 did not itself demonstrate legal error.
5. Other grounds. The material supplied disclosed no possible bias or dishonesty. The decisions about the timing and arrangements for contact disclosed no error warranting appellate interference. The general reliance on Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention 1950, including the variation concerning classes attended during contact, was insufficiently substantive to be arguable.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On appeal from the Chesterfield County Court, the court extended time, granted permission on ground 6 concerning the child-support consequence of reduced contact, refused permission on the remaining eight grounds, and reserved judgment on ground 6.