Houghton v Sheffield City Council

On a second appeal under rule 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules, permission requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason. A complaint confined to whether a county court reached an arguable conclusion on the facts does not satisfy that threshold. A county court may infer cooperation with a housing-benefit department from payments made and may find it perverse to treat homelessness as intentional where rent arrears were nil or virtually nil when the tenancy ended. Such a conclusion may be confined to its particular facts and need not establish a general duty of extensive cross-departmental enquiries. The Court of Appeal also found no basis for challenging the county court’s power to vary rather than remit the decision.

Mr Ian Houghton occupied insecure accommodation provided by Sheffield City Council. His rent was funded substantially by housing benefit. Following rent arrears, the council served a notice to quit and later obtained possession, although the arrears were reduced to approximately £7.06 after housing-benefit payments.

When Mr Houghton later applied for housing assistance, the council decided under section 191 of the Housing Act 1996 that he was intentionally homeless. The review under section 202 upheld that decision. On appeal under section 204, Sheffield County Court held the decision perverse and varied it to a finding that he was not intentionally homeless. The council sought permission for a second appeal, challenging the finding of perversity and the decision to vary rather than remit. The central issue was whether any important point of principle or practice arose.

Application refused. Permission for a second appeal was refused.

1. The application was governed by rule 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Permission could be granted only if the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. The council’s arguments raised no such point.
2. The county court’s jurisdiction under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 was confined to errors of law and was akin to judicial review. The county court was entitled to examine whether the authority’s decision was legally sustainable.
3. Substantial and wilful failure to pay rent could fall within section 191. However, on the particular facts, the county court was entitled to infer cooperation with the housing-benefit department because housing benefit had in fact been paid. It was also entitled to regard a decision that Mr Houghton was intentionally homeless as perverse where the tenancy ended with no, or virtually no, rent arrears. The conclusion was fact-specific and created no general requirement for extensive enquiries between local-authority departments.
4. The council’s argument that the unpaid shortfall during the adjournment amounted to a wilful refusal to pay was arguable only on the facts. It did not show that the county court was legally unable to reach its conclusion.
5. The county court had power under section 204 to vary the decision rather than remit it. The challenge to that course raised no separate point of principle or practice. The formal order was: Application refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Neuberger LJ refused permission on paper on 27 October 2006. Lord Justice May refused the application after an oral hearing under rule 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
• Sheffield County Court: Allowed Mr Houghton’s appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996, held the intentional-homelessness decision perverse, and varied it to a finding that he was not intentionally homeless.