Littlefair, Williamson, & Beardall v Vinamul

A compromise reached in solicitor-to-solicitor negotiations is binding where the communications, objectively understood in context, show offer and acceptance and do not make later written confirmation a condition of agreement. A later letter may merely confirm an agreement already made. The scope of the compromise must be identified carefully: an agreement concerning one head of claim does not necessarily dispose of another. On appeal from a preliminary issue tried without oral evidence, where the appellate court is in no worse position than the judge and no discretion is involved, it must determine whether the judge was wrong on the material before the court.

Three former employees claimed damages for personal injury allegedly caused by chemical exposure and industrial vibration. Their claims had been stayed pending the settlement of a lead claim. The defendant made an offer concerning the chemical claims on a basis that each side would bear its own costs. Following the withdrawal of union funding, the claimants’ solicitor told the defendant’s solicitor that the chemical claims would no longer be pursued, while vibration claims would continue. After union funding was restored, the claimants sought to revive the chemical claims.

Hodge J held that no compromise had been concluded: [2005] EWHC 204 (QB). The central issue was whether the communications, particularly the telephone conversation of 7 June 2004, created a binding compromise.

1. Appeal allowed. The claims for damages arising from chemical exposure had been validly compromised. The compromise required the claimants to discontinue those parts of their actions, with each side bearing its own costs on that issue.
2. The appellate task was to decide whether the judge was wrong on the material before the court under Part 52.11.3(a) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. Since the judge had heard no oral evidence, was in no better position to evaluate the evidence, and had exercised no discretion, the Court of Appeal could determine the issue for itself.
3. The offer made on 12 May 2004, as clarified during the telephone conversation of 18 May, provided the relevant contractual context. The notes of the 7 June conversation showed that the claimants, apart from three other employees whose position was irrelevant to these respondents’ claims, had given clear instructions to withdraw their chemical exposure claims. That withdrawal was made on the basis that each side would bear its own costs.
4. The absence of a formal exchange of letters, incomplete attendance notes, and the later written confirmation did not prevent agreement. There was no indication that written confirmation was a condition of acceptance. The letters of 10 June confirmed the position already reached and did not purport to create the compromise. Subsequent correspondence concerning the Beardall claim related to vibration, not chemicals, and was consistent with the earlier compromise.
5. The order of Hodge J was therefore set aside and the declaration sought by the appellants was granted.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal and declared that the chemical exposure claims had been validly compromised.
• Queen’s Bench Division: On the preliminary issue, Hodge J held that no compromise had been concluded: [2005] EWHC 204 (QB).