Taylor, Re

In a proposed second appeal, the Court of Appeal may entertain the appeal only if it raises an important point of principle or practice or there is another compelling reason under section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. Permission also requires a challenge with a reasonable prospect of success. A party cannot reopen concluded ancillary-relief orders without a properly arguable basis. Complaints that are misplaced or outside the relevant judge’s jurisdiction do not create an appealable issue. Where the lower court was not plainly wrong and neither statutory second-appeal criterion is met, permission must be refused.

Mrs Rita Taylor sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal against McFarlane J’s order of 29 November 2005, which dismissed her application for leave to appeal out of time. The order did not identify the underlying order, but the proceedings appeared to concern matrimonial financial and protective applications in the Principal Registry of the Family Division.

Mrs Taylor challenged District Judge Maple’s dismissal of her claims, including an attempt to revisit earlier periodical-payments and ancillary-relief orders. She alleged non-service of documents, breaches of the Human Rights Act 1988, perjury, harassment and hardship. McFarlane J found no basis to reopen the financial orders and concluded that the District Judge had not been plainly wrong. The central questions were whether the proposed appeal had a reasonable prospect of success and whether, as a second appeal, it met the statutory threshold.

Permission to appeal refused. The proposed appeal had no reasonable prospect of success, and it raised neither an important point of principle or practice nor another compelling reason.

1. The proceedings appeared to be matrimonial-cause proceedings in the Principal Registry of the Family Division, treated by virtue of section 42 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 as pending in a divorce county court.
2. McFarlane J had properly treated the application as a preliminary hearing of the proposed appeal. There was no basis for reopening the earlier financial orders, including the periodical-payments order. District Judge Maple had not been plainly wrong in dismissing Mrs Taylor’s claims.
3. Because McFarlane J had made his order on appeal from District Judge Maple, any further appeal to the Court of Appeal would be a second appeal. Under section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, the Court of Appeal could not entertain it unless one of the statutory criteria was satisfied. Neither criterion applied.
4. The complaints about non-service were unsupported by the court file. The proposed claims under the Human Rights Act 1988 and for perjury were misplaced and outside the relevant judge’s jurisdiction. The children-related complaints also disclosed no proper basis for intervention, particularly as two children were adults and the third was aged 17.

The application for permission to appeal was therefore refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (Wall LJ), 16 May 2006: refused permission to appeal.
• High Court of Justice, Family Division (McFarlane J), 29 November 2005: dismissed Mrs Taylor’s application for leave to appeal out of time and found no basis to reopen the financial orders.
• Principal Registry of the Family Division (District Judge Maple): dismissed Mrs Taylor’s claims, including the claims considered in September 2005. An earlier ancillary-relief order made on 23 January 2003 had not been appealed.