Ranbaxy (UK) Ltd. v Warner-Lambert Company

The supplied judgment text concerns the proper implementation of a tribunal’s findings when deciding whether a person qualifies for humanitarian protection. A decision-maker must give effect to the substance of the tribunal’s findings, not merely its formal labels or operative wording. A real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment may qualify a person for humanitarian protection even where the risk is connected with a medical condition. The case is different from a claim based only on the unavailability of medical treatment on return. Where the medical condition itself, together with prevailing societal attitudes, creates the risk of ill-treatment, the case may fall within the exceptional category attracting humanitarian protection.

The judgment text describes an appeal by an Afghan national against refusal of permission to apply for judicial review. The challenge concerned the Secretary of State’s decision to grant discretionary leave rather than five years’ leave said to follow from humanitarian protection.

The First-tier Tribunal had allowed the appellant’s appeal on human-rights grounds after finding a real risk of suicide, deterioration in mental health, homelessness, destitution and inhuman treatment on return to Afghanistan. It had dismissed the appeal on asylum grounds and under the Immigration Rules. The central issue was whether the tribunal’s findings, properly read, required the Secretary of State to grant humanitarian protection despite the absence of an express formal conclusion to that effect.

1. Appeal allowed. The Secretary of State was required to acknowledge the substance of the First-tier Tribunal’s findings and grant leave consistently with them.
2. The tribunal’s determination had to be read as a whole. Its findings that the appellant faced a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in Afghanistan, including through societal attitudes to mental illness and the absence of family or treatment support, satisfied the criteria for humanitarian protection. The tribunal’s failure expressly to refer to paragraph 339C did not displace the substance of those findings.
3. The distinction between an ordinary medical case and a humanitarian-protection case was material. A claim based only on the consequences of inadequate medical care in the receiving country falls within the medical-case policy. By contrast, where the medical condition itself, together with conditions in the receiving country, creates a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, that risk can attract humanitarian protection.
4. The Deputy High Court Judge had read the First-tier Tribunal’s findings too narrowly by treating the risk as arising only from the absence of proper medical care. The risk arose from the combination of the appellant’s condition and the societal attitudes prevalent in Afghanistan.
5. Requiring a further appeal against the First-tier Tribunal’s determination would have elevated form over substance. The Secretary of State’s decision was unlawful because it failed to implement the tribunal’s findings in a legally consistent manner. Lord Justice Lewison and Lord Justice Vos agreed with Lord Justice Tomlinson.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal allowed against the refusal of permission to apply for judicial review.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Mr Robin Purchas QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, refused permission to apply for judicial review on 11 February 2014.
• First-tier Tribunal: Judge Phillips allowed the appellant’s appeal on human-rights grounds but dismissed it on asylum grounds and under the Immigration Rules. The Upper Tribunal had earlier set aside a different First-tier Tribunal determination and directed a rehearing.