Hardison, R. v

A claimed right to personal autonomy, private life or religious observance does not provide a defence to offences involving controlled drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The statutory prohibitions form part of national drug-control policy protecting public health and meeting international obligations.

A procedural deficiency does not render a conviction unsafe merely because it is arguable. The defendant must have suffered an actual disadvantage in preparing or presenting the case. A properly joined count should be severed only where a special feature makes joinder prejudicial or embarrassing and a separate trial is required in the interests of justice. On sentence for multiple grave drug offences, the ultimate issue is whether the totality of the offending justifies the aggregate sentence.

Following an eight-week jury trial at Lewes Crown Court, Casey Hardison was convicted of offences involving the production, possession, intended supply and export of Class A controlled drugs. He was sentenced to concurrent terms totalling 20 years’ imprisonment.

He renewed his application for leave to appeal against conviction and, with the single judge’s leave, appealed against sentence. His grounds included a claimed human-rights defence based on personal autonomy and religious use of drugs, severance, disclosure, trial fairness and the adequacy of facilities available to him as an unrepresented remand prisoner. On sentence, he challenged the judge’s assessment of the scale of the operation and the resulting total sentence.

1. Disposition. The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused. The appeal against sentence was dismissed.
2. Human-rights defence. The trial judge correctly held that the asserted right to alter consciousness through hallucinogenic drugs was not a defence in law. Any Convention rights engaged did not invalidate the prohibitions in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The court followed Taylor (Paul) [2002] 1 Cr.App.R. 519, which treated such prohibitions as justified by the policy of combating risks to public health and by international obligations. A preparatory hearing could not have altered that conclusion.
3. Trial grounds. Count 8 was properly joined with the other drug counts. Applying section 5(3) of the Indictments Act 1915, there was no special feature making joinder prejudicial or embarrassing, or requiring a separate trial in the interests of justice. The remaining complaints did not disclose an unsafe conviction. In particular, the absence of longer computer access did not undermine the refusal of an adjournment or the fairness of the trial because the appellant had not been disadvantaged in fact.
4. Sentence. The judge was entitled to find deliberate production of Class A drugs on a large commercial scale. The material found at the premises was only a snapshot, while documents and other evidence supported the inference of much larger LSD production. The individual guideline comparison drawn from Hurley [1998] 1 Cr.App.R(S) 299 did not decide the appeal: the governing question was whether the totality of all six offences justified 20 years. Although the operation was smaller than that in Kemp (1979) 69 Cr.App.R. 330, it was sophisticated, sustained and profit-driven. The concurrent total was severe but not manifestly excessive.
5. Costs. As no assessable assets remained after confiscation proceedings, no recovery of defence costs order was made.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Refused the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction and dismissed the appeal against sentence.
• Lewes Crown Court: After an eight-week jury trial, convicted the appellant on six counts involving Class A drugs and imposed concurrent sentences totalling 20 years’ imprisonment.