Rose, R. v

Evidence of a defendant’s unusual movements after an alleged offence may be admitted where it is relevant and probative. Its possible innocent explanation and the strength of any inference are ordinarily matters for the jury. Qualified recognition evidence may also be admissible where it supports, or is consistent with, other evidence implicating the defendant, subject to section 78 considerations.

A summing-up must be assessed as a whole. A comment which might better have been omitted will not render it unfair where the directions remain balanced, clear and fair. On an appeal against conviction, fresh evidence and all grounds must be assessed cumulatively when deciding whether the conviction is safe.

Following a six-week trial at Exeter Crown Court, Nicholas Tom Rose was convicted of the murder of Charlotte Pinkney, who disappeared after leaving a party with him. Her body was not found. The Crown relied on circumstantial and scientific evidence, including blood and DNA evidence connected with the appellant and the car he had driven.

The appellant maintained that he had left Charlotte near a community centre. He relied principally on witnesses who claimed to have seen her after the time at which the Crown alleged she had died.

On appeal, he challenged the admission of evidence concerning his later movements and qualified identification evidence, and alleged unfairness in the summing-up. He also sought to adduce evidence from two further purported sighting witnesses. The central issue was whether, cumulatively, those matters rendered the conviction unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The conviction was safe. The Crown’s circumstantial case was very strong, particularly the unexplained scientific evidence, the blood and DNA evidence, the clothing-related evidence, and the appellant’s activities after the disappearance.

2. The evidence concerning the appellant’s trip to Lee Bay was properly admitted. The jury were entitled to consider his movements in the period after the alleged killing. His unusual conduct was relevant and probative of whether he had been disposing of evidence or concealing the body. Whether the area was suitable for that purpose, and what inference should be drawn, were matters for the jury.

3. Mrs Woodward’s qualified recognition evidence was also admissible. It was relevant because it placed the appellant returning towards the reservoir area, and it supported the Crown case. The court applied the admissibility basis identified in George [2002] EWCA Crim. 1923. The weakness of the identification and its inconsistency with other evidence affected weight, not admissibility. The trial judge had also given an adequate Turnbull direction. There was no legal basis to challenge either ruling insofar as it involved a discretion under section 78.

4. The summing-up remained fair when read as a whole. The judge correctly directed that the Crown had to make the jury sure and that any sighting of Charlotte after the alleged time of death which might be correct required an acquittal. Although one comment about the absence of later sightings might better not have been made at that point, it did not unbalance an otherwise careful and fair summing-up. The court applied the requirement, stated in Bryant [2005] EWCA Crim. 2075, that a summing-up be neutral and balanced.

5. The court received Mr Perrin’s additional evidence without undertaking a fine analysis of the section 23 criteria, but found his asserted recollection of the relevant date unreliable. Ms Humphries’s evidence was incapable of belief and should not be received. Taken cumulatively with the appeal grounds, the additional evidence did not cast doubt on the safety of the conviction.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Appeal against conviction dismissed; the conviction was held safe.
• Crown Court at Exeter: On 17 February 2005, following a six-week jury trial before Judge Cottle, the appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, with a recommendation of a minimum term of 20 years.