Ramaj & Anor, R. v

When sentencing after mixed verdicts, the court must proceed on the factual basis necessarily established by those verdicts. It may not sentence on allegations of coercion, captivity or rape of which the defendant was acquitted.

A sentence for trafficking under section 57 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 must reflect the offender’s actual role, the duration and scale of the enterprise, the victim’s vulnerability, and personal mitigation. Comparable trafficking and brothel-management sentences assist the assessment, but must be adjusted for material differences in seriousness.

Ramaj was convicted at the Crown Court at Wood Green of trafficking an 18-year-old Lithuanian woman, S, into the United Kingdom for sexual exploitation, contrary to section 57 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and of keeping a brothel used for prostitution. He received ten years’ detention for trafficking and a concurrent eighteen months for brothel keeping.

Ramaj had been acquitted of false imprisonment, rape and controlling prostitution for gain. He renewed his application for leave to appeal against conviction, alleging inconsistent verdicts, and appealed against sentence. Atesogullari, who had pleaded guilty to keeping the brothel, renewed his application for leave to appeal against his eighteen-month sentence.

The central issues were whether the verdicts were inconsistent and whether the sentences properly reflected the factual basis left by the acquittals and the relative seriousness of the offending.

1. Ramaj’s renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused. The verdicts were reconcilable. The jury could accept that Ramaj arranged or facilitated S’s arrival and supply to the brothel, while not being sure that she had been restrained, raped, or did not consent to prostitution. The trial judge had correctly directed that arrangements for a willing prostitute could still amount to an offence under section 57 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

2. Ramaj’s sentence appeal was allowed. The acquittals meant only that the jury were not sure S had come to England unwillingly. That was the required basis for sentence. It would be wrong to sentence upon coercion, captivity, rape or compelled prostitution that had not been established.

3. The ten-year trafficking sentence was substantially too long. Ramaj had been a principal in bringing S to the United Kingdom and supplying her to the brothel, but he was 19, of previous good character, and involved in a brief and small-scale operation. S’s youth, naivety and the adverse impact on her remained aggravating features. Comparison with R v Maka [2005] EWCA Crim 3365 and R v Roci and Ismailaj [2005] EWCA Crim 3404, whose facts were materially more serious, confirmed that five years’ detention was appropriate.

4. The eighteen-month brothel-keeping sentences were also excessive. In light of the small, brief and amateur nature of the operation, and comparison with R v Rousseau [2003] 1 Cr App R(S) 15 and R v Middleton [2005] 1 Cr App R 42, three months was appropriate. Ramaj’s sentence on that count was substituted accordingly. Leave was granted to Atesogullari; unless he sought restoration within 21 days, his appeal would be allowed and his sentence substituted with three months’ imprisonment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Ramaj’s renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused. His sentence appeal was allowed, reducing detention from ten years to five years for trafficking and from eighteen months to three months for keeping a brothel. Atesogullari was granted leave to appeal against sentence, subject to the stated restoration procedure.
• Crown Court at Wood Green: Ramaj was convicted of trafficking contrary to section 57 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and of keeping a brothel used for prostitution contrary to section 33 (A) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. He was acquitted of false imprisonment, rape and controlling prostitution for gain. Atesogullari pleaded guilty to keeping the brothel.