Attorney General v Perotti

A civil proceedings order under Supreme Court Act 1981, section 42, is justified where a person has habitually and persistently, without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious proceedings or made vexatious applications. The court must assess the whole history of the litigation, including repetition, the manner in which proceedings were conducted, and the harassment and expense caused. Repetition need not concern the same defendant or grievance. Existing civil restraint orders do not prevent a section 42 order where they have merely limited, rather than ended, the abusive conduct. The statutory leave procedure provides a proportionate safeguard because future proceedings or applications may proceed if they are not an abuse of process and have reasonable grounds.

The Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for a civil proceedings order against Angelo Perotti. The application followed a long-running probate dispute concerning his late uncle’s estate, numerous unsuccessful proceedings and applications, repeated appeals, contempt proceedings, and successive civil restraint orders. Mr Perotti opposed the application, seeking to reopen the merits of earlier decisions and arguing that existing restraint orders were sufficient. The central issues were whether his conduct was habitual, persistent, vexatious and without reasonable ground, and whether a further statutory order was necessary.

1. Order made. The court was satisfied that Mr Perotti had habitually and persistently, without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious civil proceedings and made vexatious applications. An indefinite civil proceedings order was therefore made under section 42, with a penal notice attached.
2. The court applied the guidance in In re Vernazza and Attorney General v Barker. Whether proceedings are vexatious depends on the whole history and conduct of the litigation, not merely whether individual pleadings disclose a cause of action. Vexatious proceedings have little or no legal basis, impose disproportionate inconvenience, harassment and expense, and abuse the court process. Habitual and persistent litigation means continuing to litigate after earlier litigation has failed when, objectively, the time has come to stop.
3. Following Attorney General v Covey, repetition need not concern the same defendant or the same subject matter. The relevant question is whether the defendant’s entire litigious activity demonstrates the necessary repetition. The court considered the repeated claims, hopeless applications and appeals, attempts to relitigate settled issues, and criminal allegations arising from the same obsession.
4. Applying Attorney General v Jones, the court would not permit Mr Perotti to reargue findings made in the underlying litigation. Any challenge to those findings had to be pursued by appeal or other appropriate proceedings in the original disputes.
5. Existing restraint orders had not stopped the conduct. They had limited duplication, but had not prevented unreasonable appeals, applications in proceedings brought by others, or the redirection of the same complaints into criminal allegations. A section 42 order provided a clearer statutory framework. Under section 42(3), leave remained available where proposed proceedings or applications were not abusive and had reasonable grounds.
6. The order was of indefinite duration. The court noted that the jurisdiction to vary such an order remained available if entirely new conditions arose, following Attorney General v Covey and Bhamjee v Forsdick. Permission to appeal was refused, but leave was given to seek permission from the Court of Appeal.

First-instance application in the Administrative Court. No prior appellate decision in the same application was stated.