Lawrence v Pembrokeshire County Council

Professionals investigating suspected child abuse do not owe a common-law duty of care to a parent suspected of causing the abuse. The controlling consideration is the conflict between the professional’s duty to protect the child and any duty owed to the parent. The Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 8 do not require the common law to recognise an additional negligence claim. A parent may have a claim under the Act, but that does not remove the public-policy basis for denying a negligence duty. The same principle applies to procedural complaints about the investigation and child-protection decision-making. Where the pleaded facts disclose no legally viable duty, the negligence claim may be struck out and summary judgment entered.

The claimant alleged that social workers employed by the defendant negligently investigated concerns about her children, placed their names on the Child Protection Register, and continued that registration despite procedural failures. She also claimed psychiatric injury and breach of Article 8 under sections 6 and 7(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

The defendant accepted that the pleaded facts disclosed an arguable Human Rights Act claim but relied on the House of Lords decision in D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust, which denied a negligence duty to parents suspected of child abuse. The claimant argued that the Human Rights Act and Strasbourg jurisprudence required an incremental development of the common law, and that the pleaded facts established sufficient proximity.

1. Procedure. The court treated the application under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and Part 24.2 as a determination of preliminary legal issues. The pleaded facts were assumed in the claimant’s favour. The court could finally determine the issues because there had been full argument and the claimant expressly sought an early ruling.
2. Duty of care to suspected parents. The majority reasoning in D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust remained applicable. A professional investigating suspected abuse must be able to act single-mindedly in the child’s interests. A duty owed to the suspected parent could conflict with that duty and might influence decisions about investigation, reporting, protection, or registration. The principle applied equally to social workers and to complaints about the procedure by which the child-protection decision was reached.
3. The Human Rights Act did not invalidate that public-policy reasoning. The Court of Appeal decision in D had itself maintained the absence of a negligence duty to parents, notwithstanding the Strasbourg authorities and the development of claims by children. Article 8 could provide a separate remedy, but it did not require a concurrent negligence remedy. The court considered that Article 8(2) could accommodate the public interest in allowing professionals to investigate suspected abuse without exposure to negligence claims by suspected parents.
4. The claimant’s proximity argument failed. Her claim was, in substance, that the social workers had negligently concluded that the children were at risk of emotional harm from her and their father. Their primary duty was to protect the children. The pleaded facts were not materially different from those considered in D.
5. The negligence claim was bad in law and bound to fail. It was struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(a), and the defendant was granted summary judgment under Part 24.2.

First-instance decision. No earlier decision in the same proceedings is stated.