Stepp v Government of the United States of America & Anor

In an extradition appeal under Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003, allegations of motive and opportunity to fabricate evidence do not, without more, establish bad faith or abuse of process by the requesting state. The extradition court is not required to conduct a full fact-finding exercise on disputed allegations which are properly matters for trial.

Speciality arrangements exist where the law of, or arrangements with, the requesting territory ensure that the extradited person may be dealt with only for an offence within section 95(4), or may leave the territory. Section 95 does not require the individual defendant to have standing to enforce the speciality rule in the requesting state.

The appellant faced extradition to the United States to stand trial in Ohio for allegations including rape, kidnapping and sexual battery. The District Judge rejected his challenges based on alleged police fabrication and found the statutory and Convention requirements satisfied. The Secretary of State ordered extradition.

The appellant appealed both the District Judge’s decision under section 103 of the Extradition Act 2003 and the Secretary of State’s decision under section 108. The surviving issues were whether the evidence disclosed bad faith or abuse of process, and whether the absence of a settled right for the defendant to raise speciality before the United States courts meant that section 95 was not satisfied.

1. Bad faith and abuse of process. The court accepted that an extradition judge has jurisdiction to refuse extradition for abuse of process where the prosecutor acts in bad faith. That jurisdiction was not engaged on the facts. Even assuming the appellant’s evidence and documents were accurate, they showed at most motive and opportunity for the police to injure him. They did not provide a proper basis for finding that the complainants’ accounts were fabricated, particularly when the complainants and police officers had not given evidence. The absence of disclosure by the requesting state did not assist the appellant because disclosure was not required under the Act.
2. The underlying factual allegations were matters for the Ohio trial. The appellant did not contend that he would be denied a fair trial on return. The District Judge was therefore entitled to reject the factual challenge and the related Convention arguments.
3. Speciality. The court adopted the reasoning in Welsh and Thrasher [2006] EWHC 156 (Admin), as approved and applied in Bermingham and others [2006] EWHC 200 (Admin). Section 95 asks whether, under the law of the requesting territory or arrangements made between it and the United Kingdom, the person may be dealt with only for an offence within section 95(4), or may first leave the territory. It does not require the individual defendant to possess standing to raise speciality before the requesting state’s courts.
4. The evidence did not establish routine disregard of speciality by United States courts. The cited authorities instead indicated adherence to the rule, although United States and United Kingdom interpretations might differ. That possible difference did not show that the statutory speciality arrangements were absent.
5. Both appeals were dismissed.

The judgment describes appeals from:

• Bow Street Magistrates’ Court: the District Judge sent the case to the Secretary of State under the Extradition Act 2003.
• Secretary of State for the Home Department: an order for extradition to the United States was made on 17 October 2005.
• High Court (Administrative Court): appeals under sections 103 and 108 were dismissed.