Director of Public Prosecutions v Meakin

A stay for abuse of process is an exceptional remedy. It should be granted only where the defendant establishes prejudice so serious that a fair trial is impossible. Fairness includes the interests of the prosecution and the public, not merely those of the defendant. A prosecution disclosure error does not ordinarily justify a stay where the alleged material could be investigated and used through the ordinary trial process. The defence must take reasonable procedural steps to obtain and secure evidence on which it intends to rely. Evidential disputes, including challenges under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, should generally be resolved during the trial.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated from the decision of Bury Magistrates’ Court, which stayed proceedings against James Meakin on a charge of driving with excess alcohol, contrary to section 5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The magistrates considered that the defendant could not receive a fair trial because the prosecution had not disclosed the identity of a member of the public who reported the accident. They also refused leave for proposed hearsay evidence because notice had not been given. The central issues were whether the disclosure failure constituted an abuse of process, whether the proceedings should be stayed, and whether the hearsay ruling was correct.

1. The appeal was allowed. The magistrates’ orders were quashed, the stay was removed, and the case was remitted for a rehearing before a differently constituted bench.

2. A stay for abuse of process is wholly exceptional. It is unavailable unless the defendant shows prejudice of such seriousness that a fair trial is impossible. There was no allegation of bad faith or serious misconduct. The prosecution’s failure to disclose the caller’s name was not sufficient to meet that threshold, particularly because the defence had not requested the details, sought to interview the caller, or applied for a witness summons.

3. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the caller’s name should have been disclosed, although the redaction of her address and telephone number was justified. The real question was whether she could give material evidence and whether the defence intended to call her. If the defence wished to rely on her, it was responsible for making proper enquiries and securing her attendance.

4. Fairness extends to the prosecution and the public as well as the defendant. The public interest required the straightforward drink-driving prosecution to proceed to determination. The alleged failure could be addressed within the trial process and did not make a fair trial impossible. The observations of Auld LJ reproduced in Gleeson [2003] EWCA Crim 3357 reinforced that a criminal trial is a search for truth and is not a game giving a guilty defendant a sporting chance.

5. The roadside questioning issue could have been dealt with under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The court also considered that, if the hearsay question arose, the magistrates should have answered it in the affirmative, despite observing that the question might not strictly have arisen.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The Divisional Court allowed the prosecution’s appeal by way of case stated, quashed the magistrates’ orders, removed the stay and directed a rehearing.
• Bury Magistrates’ Court: Proceedings were stayed on the ground of abuse of process.