Parents for Legal Action Ltd, R (on the application of) v Northumberl County Council

Statutory consultation about school reorganisation must address the particular schools affected before proposals to alter or close them are published. A local authority may consult in stages and may adopt a preferred county-wide framework, but it must not treat that preliminary decision as excluding meaningful consultation about whether individual schools should adopt the proposed structure. Later rights to object do not cure an earlier defective consultation. A public authority may reconsider and withdraw a previous decision to obtain an independent evaluation, provided its ultimate decision is rational and based on the material before it. A legitimate expectation cannot arise from an internal decision made solely for the authority’s own purposes and conferring no procedural or substantive benefit on the claimant.

The claimant challenged Northumberland County Council’s decision of 19 April 2005 to adopt a two-tier education system as the preferred framework for further consultation. The Council had conducted county-wide consultation at Stages 0 and 1, followed by local consultation concerning particular school partnerships and schools at Stage 2.

The claimant alleged that the consultation was unlawful because Stage 2 was confined to two-tier models, that the Council had failed to obtain an independent evaluation required by an earlier resolution, and that financial costings placed before the Council were misleading. The issues concerned the statutory consultation duties under sections 28 and 29 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998, fairness, legitimate expectation, material considerations and rationality.

1. First complaint — consultation. The statutory consultation required by sections 28(5) and 29(4) of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 had to comply with the established consultation principles: it had to occur while proposals remained formative, provide sufficient reasons for an intelligent response, allow adequate time, and be conscientiously considered. It also had to relate to the particular schools proposed to be altered or discontinued.
2. There was no legal objection to a phased consultation process, to treating Stages 0, 1 and 2 as one process, or to adopting a preliminary county-wide preference for a two-tier system. The defect was that the Council treated its 19 April 2005 decision as excluding any discussion at Stage 2 of whether particular school partnerships or schools should adopt a two-tier system at all.
3. Since the earlier stages had not consulted on the implications for individual schools, Stage 2 had to provide a meaningful opportunity to consider whether particular middle schools should join a two-tier system or remain within a three-tier system. The Council’s approach meant that the proposals were no longer at a formative stage and denied objectors a real opportunity to present their case against particular closures. The consultation was therefore unlawful and unfair. Later statutory rights to object under Schedule 6 did not cure the earlier defect.
4. Second complaint — independent evaluation and legitimate expectation. The Council had no general legal duty to obtain an independent evaluation. Its earlier resolution requiring one was a decision made for its own purposes, which it could lawfully reconsider and reverse. The Council was entitled to decide the manner and intensity of its inquiry, subject to rationality review, and was not irrational in proceeding on the material available.
5. The earlier resolution was not a promise to the claimant or consultees and conferred no procedural or substantive benefit on them. It therefore could not generate a legitimate expectation. In any event, proceeding without the evaluation was neither unfair enough to constitute an abuse of power nor a breach of legitimate expectation.
6. Third complaint — financial information. The material before the Council was not shown to be misleading or misunderstood. The Council had the relevant educational and financial considerations before it and was entitled to evaluate them. The complaint therefore failed.
7. The claimant succeeded only on the first complaint. The decision was not quashed and no declaration was granted that the 19 April 2005 decision itself was unlawful. The claimant was in principle entitled to declaratory relief concerning the proper form of the Stage 2 consultation.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The judgment states that permission was granted by Jackson J on 25 August 2005 and that permission to amend and pursue the third complaint was granted during the final hearing. No appellate decision is stated.