Cameron & Ors v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd

A commercial railway infrastructure owner was not a core public authority under the Human Rights Act 1998. Its maintenance of track and points was in any event a private act rather than a public function. Public-authority status depends on the body's governmental character, statutory powers, funding, accountability, public-service role and relationship with the state.

Article 2 does not require compensation for every relative of a person killed through ordinary negligence. A state may reasonably restrict recovery to the estate and financially dependent relatives where civil remedies, an inquest and other investigative processes provide an effective system.

The one-year limitation period for a human-rights claim may be extended only where the claimant proves that an extension is equitable in all the circumstances.

The claim arose from the Potters Bar train crash, in which Agnes Quinlan was fatally injured by debris falling from a damaged railway bridge. Her daughters, who were not financially dependent upon her, and another claimant sought damages from the railway infrastructure owner.

The claimants alleged breaches of articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, sought recognition of a new tort of wrongful death, and challenged statutory restrictions upon bereavement damages. The defendant applied for summary judgment under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 and also relied upon the one-year limitation period in section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

The principal issues were whether the defendant was a public authority, or performed a public function, when maintaining the track and points; whether article 2 required a wider compensatory remedy; and whether time should be extended.

1. Judgment was entered for the defendant under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 on the whole claim. The claim had no real prospect of success because the defendant was neither a public authority nor acting as one in maintaining the railway, the article 2 claim was bound to fail, and no extension of the statutory limitation period was justified.

2. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 distinguishes core public authorities, hybrid authorities performing public functions, and private acts. The inquiry is contextual. Relevant considerations include governmental character, public funding, statutory powers, replacement of central or local government, provision of a public service, democratic accountability, state supervision, special powers and whether the body must act in the public interest.

   Applying those considerations, Railtrack was a commercial company operating for shareholder profit. It lacked public funding, democratic accountability, state-appointed directors, regulatory responsibility, special powers and an obligation to act only in the public interest. Regulatory responsibility for railway safety rested with public bodies including the Health and Safety Executive. Railtrack was therefore not a core public authority. Even if it otherwise had hybrid functions, maintaining track and points was plainly a private function.

3. Article 2 imposes substantive duties to protect life through an appropriate legal framework and procedural duties to provide an effective system for investigating potentially unlawful deaths. It did not require the state to provide bereavement damages to daughters who were neither dependants nor otherwise entitled under the existing statutory scheme. The estate could claim for the deceased's losses, dependants could claim where financial loss existed, and ordinary negligence could be addressed through civil proceedings, the inquest and health and safety law.

   No gross negligence or manslaughter was alleged. It was within the state's reasonable margin of appreciation to define the class entitled to compensation by reference to financial dependency. The article 8 claim consequently also had no prospect of success.

4. Under section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998, the claimant seeking an extension bears the burden of proving circumstances which make an extension equitable. The considerations identified in section 33(3) of the Limitation Act 1980 are relevant, though they are not incorporated wholesale.

   The claimants knew of the possible human-rights issue, had access to legal advice and took no effective action for a substantial period after liability was denied. The defendant had not induced delay and would face a considerable administrative burden if required to defend the merits. No extension was equitable.

5. Because these conclusions disposed of the proceedings, it was unnecessary to decide whether the common law should recognise a new tort of wrongful death.