A v South Staffordshire Magistrates

The dismissal of an information in a magistrates’ court has the same effect as an acquittal on indictment. A defendant cannot subsequently be prosecuted for the same offence where the earlier acquittal necessarily involved acquittal of the later charge. Where the prosecution seeks to substitute or increase a charge, it should apply to amend the existing charge or adjourn it. Offering no evidence on the original charge and then inviting a guilty plea to that charge may result in a prohibited second prosecution.

The claimant, aged 15 when charged, faced proceedings in a youth court for assault occasioning actual bodily harm under section 47. The prosecution later considered a more serious charge under section 20 and the section 47 charge was dismissed after no evidence was offered. Following a later trial, the prosecution abandoned the section 20 allegation and invited the claimant to plead guilty to the section 47 offence. He did so.

Judicial review was sought to quash the resulting conviction. The central issue was whether the earlier dismissal had amounted to an acquittal, so that the claimant had already been in jeopardy for the same offence.

1. Application allowed. The conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm was quashed. The claimant had previously been acquitted when the Youth Court dismissed the section 47 information. The case was analogous to the position governed by section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967.
2. Section 27 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 provides that dismissal of an information has the same effect as an acquittal on indictment. It was irrelevant that the prosecution had chosen to offer no evidence. The dismissal disposed of the charge and left the magistrates functus officio.
3. The governing question was whether the claimant had previously been in jeopardy on the charge. A plea of autrefois acquit succeeds where the earlier acquittal necessarily involves an acquittal of the subsequent charge. The principle applied where the later charge was based on the same facts, involved the same victim and concerned assault occasioning actual bodily harm arising from the same alleged assault.
4. The court followed the approach in R v G [2001] EWCA Crim 1215, which treated the difference between common assault and assault occasioning actual bodily harm as the causing of actual injury, while the relevant mens rea remained the same. The earlier decision in Brookes [1995] Crim LR 630 was not followed in that authority and could not justify the conviction.
5. The proper course in February 2005 would have been to apply to amend the section 47 charge to section 20, or to adjourn the section 47 allegation. Sections 44 and 45 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 did not affect the issue; they concerned private prosecutions.
6. Proceedings against young offenders should be conducted expeditiously. Courts should exercise firm control over delay, and the Crown Prosecution Service should assist the court by providing relevant papers and stating its position on judicial review.

Costs were ordered from central funds.

The judgment does not state a prior appeal. The claimant brought judicial review in the Administrative Court against the Youth Court’s decision to proceed to conviction after the earlier dismissal.