Catt, R (on the application of) v Brighton and Hove City Council and Brighton & Anor

A screening opinion for a Schedule 2 development must assess the environmental impact of the development as a whole once the proposal crosses the relevant threshold. An authority may take proposed mitigation measures into account, provided their likely effectiveness is reasonably assessed. The decision whether significant environmental effects are likely is a judgment reviewable on ordinary public-law grounds. A screening opinion has immediate legal effect, even though the authority may exceptionally reconsider it. A challenge should therefore be brought promptly and ordinarily before the planning application is determined.

The claimant lived beside Withdean Stadium, whose use by Brighton and Hove Albion Football Club had been authorised by successive temporary planning permissions. In July 2005 the defendants granted permission for continued use until 2008, together with additional seating, facilities and traffic measures.

The claimant sought judicial review, alleging that the screening opinion unlawfully concluded that no environmental impact assessment was required, and that the planning decision failed to comply with development-plan requirements, relevant considerations and the duty to give reasons. The defendants and interested party also relied on delay under section 31(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

1. Claim dismissed. The screening opinion and planning permission were lawful. The court would in any event have refused relief for delay.
2. Under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment)(England and Wales) Regulations 1999, the Schedule 2 assessment had to consider the environmental impact of the whole resulting development, not merely the physical additions viewed in isolation. Once the proposal exceeded the applicable threshold, an artificial separation of the extension from the existing professional football use would defeat the purpose of the Regulations and the Directive (paras 16–18).
3. The question whether significant environmental effects were likely involved judgment. Intervention was justified only for irrationality or failure to consider material matters. The screening opinion considered the overall use, including match-day activity and the surrounding area, and its conclusion was lawful. A person’s loss of amenity was not necessarily an environmental effect of the required seriousness (paras 19–20).
4. The authority was entitled to take proposed mitigation measures into account when deciding whether significant effects were likely. Their probable effectiveness was a matter for assessment, with doubts resolved against the applicant. Previous experience of comparable measures provided a proper evidential basis (para 22).
5. The draft local plan was a material consideration but did not engage section 38 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act as stated in the judgment. The committee lawfully balanced residential disturbance against the club’s interests, applied the relevant policy and gave adequate reasons (paras 24–25).
6. The screening opinion was an operative decision from the date of adoption. Its theoretical capacity for reconsideration did not postpone the time for challenge. The claim should have been brought promptly, before the planning application was determined. The delay also caused prejudice to the interested party, so relief would have been refused under section 31(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (paras 30–35).