Merelie v Newcastle Primary Care Trust

An employer's duty of trust and confidence does not create a general obligation to investigate every factual dispute raised by an employee. Whether an investigation is required depends on the circumstances, including the employer's reasonable and proper cause for its decision and whether the issue remains relevant to the employment relationship.

A published grievance procedure is not contractual merely because it exists. Even if incorporated, it need not be invoked for every complaint where investigation is unnecessary, trivial or academic. Harassment requires conduct which is oppressive and unreasonable; reasonable conduct undertaken in pursuit of a legitimate workplace aim is not harassment.

The claimant, a dentist employed by the Trust, brought two actions arising from complaints about her workplace relationships, disciplinary proceedings, dismissal and subsequent correspondence. The first action alleged breach of the contractual duty of trust and confidence and negligence, principally because the Trust had not investigated complaints made about her and had permitted allegations to be repeated.

The second action alleged harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1977 and defamation arising from a letter sent by the Trust's chief executive. The central issues were whether the Trust had acted unreasonably by declining to investigate certain complaints, whether the disciplinary process involved improper repetition or encouragement of allegations, and whether the correspondence was actionable.

1. Contract and negligence. The Trust had reasonable and proper cause not to investigate the March 2000 complaints. The complaints concerned working relationships, were historic, and were addressed by a reasonable attempt to preserve workplace stability. The Trust did not thereby accept the allegations as true or breach the Malik duty.
2. The claimant's January 2001 complaint was considered within the disciplinary process. She had opportunities to challenge the evidence before the disciplinary and appeal panels. Neither the Malik duty nor the Trust's grievance procedure required a separate investigation or detailed findings on matters which were not material to the decision to terminate the employment.
3. The grievance procedure was not shown to be contractual. In any event, even if incorporated, it did not impose an absolute duty to investigate every complaint. A complaint that was academic, trivial or otherwise did not call for investigation in the continuing employment relationship need not trigger the procedure.
4. The investigators acted reasonably in considering the wider background without making findings on every historic allegation. The disciplinary and appeal panels were entitled to rely on the evidence about the claimant's working relationships and to find that those relationships had irreparably broken down.
5. Harassment. The complaints and their repetition in the disciplinary proceedings were made in good faith, on reasonable grounds and in pursuit of a legitimate workplace aim. They were neither oppressive nor unreasonable. The alleged conduct therefore did not constitute harassment. The alleged course of conduct by the chief executive also failed because it was reasonable and did not amount to harassment.
6. Defamation and damages. The chief executive's words did not bear the defamatory meaning pleaded. They did not adopt the allegations as true. Alternatively, the publication was protected by qualified privilege and was made without malice. The claimant could not recover damages for distress, and had not established causation of physical injury without appropriate expert evidence.
7. The claims in both actions were dismissed. Permission to appeal was refused.

These were first-instance proceedings. The two actions were transferred or issued in the High Court and ordered to be tried together. Earlier interlocutory orders struck out parts of the claims and removed the psychiatric-injury claim, but no appeal from a final judgment was before this court.