Director of Public Prosecutions v Uddin

On an appeal by way of case stated, an acquittal is perverse only where no reasonable tribunal, properly directed on the facts and law, could have acquitted. The existence of sufficient evidence to leave a case to answer does not require the tribunal of fact to convict. Adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence may provide additional support for the prosecution case, but they cannot alone or mainly establish guilt. Identification evidence remains a matter for the tribunal of fact, which may regard surrounding circumstances as jury points and acquit if the prosecution has not proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated against the respondent’s acquittal by justices at St Albans. The respondent was charged with taking a vehicle without consent, driving while disqualified and using a vehicle without insurance. The prosecution relied principally on a police officer’s brief identification of the respondent as the driver of a stolen vehicle, together with the respondent’s silence in interview and at trial.

The justices accepted the officer as honest but considered the identification insufficient, and dismissed the information. The central question was whether a reasonable bench, properly directed on the facts and law, could have acquitted.

1. Appeal dismissed. The justices’ decision was not perverse. A reasonable bench, properly directed, could properly have acquitted.
2. The prosecution bore the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The assessment of the police officer’s identification evidence, including the brief opportunity for observation, traffic conditions and the surrounding circumstances, was for the justices. The matters relied on by the prosecution were jury points and did not compel conviction.
3. The rejection of a submission of no case to answer did not determine the ultimate issue. At that stage the question was whether there was evidence on which properly directed fact-finders were entitled to convict, not whether they were bound to do so. After the defence case, the justices had to assess the whole evidence.
4. Under sections 34 and 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the justices were entitled, but not obliged, to draw inferences from the respondent’s silence in interview and at trial. Section 38(3) prevented conviction wholly or mainly on the strength of such an inference. Silence could provide additional support, but the justices remained entitled to conclude that the prosecution had not discharged its burden.
5. The justices had directed themselves correctly. This court could not interfere merely because it might have evaluated the evidence differently. The court also made a defendant’s costs order in respect of the respondent’s claimed travel expenses.

• Magistrates’ Court: The justices at St Albans dismissed the information on 16 September 2004.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The Divisional Court dismissed the prosecution’s appeal by way of case stated. Lord Justice Thomas agreed with Mr Justice McCombe.