Miller v Hales & Ors

For compulsory motor insurance purposes, a police constable is not an employee merely because legislation treats the office-holder as an employee for particular statutory purposes. The employment exclusion in section 145(4)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 therefore does not exclude liability for injuries sustained by a constable acting in the course of duty.

The passenger protection in section 145(4A) is directed to persons entering or being carried in a vehicle as passengers. It does not extend to a person trying to stop a vehicle, or being dragged beneath it. The provision does not impose a general requirement that every injury arising from the use of a vehicle must be insured.

The claimant, a police constable, was seriously injured when a police vehicle was driven away by an unauthorised driver during an arrest. The driver was liable in damages, and the claimant sought payment from the vehicle insurers under section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

The insurers argued that the claimant’s injuries fell within the employment exclusion in section 145(4)(a). The claimant alternatively relied on the passenger provisions in section 145(4A). The court had to determine whether either provision excluded the statutory insurance obligation.

1. The claim succeeded. The second defendant insurers were ordered to pay whatever the first defendant was bound to pay under the judgment entered against him.

2. A constable holds office and is not an employee under a contract of employment. Although a constable may be treated as an employee for specific statutory purposes, the court’s task was to construe section 145(4)(a) as enacted. There was no cogent reason to give “employment” a wider meaning covering the quasi-employment of a constable. The exclusion therefore did not apply.

3. Section 145(4A) was considered as an alternative issue. Its legislative history and the Third Council Directive showed that it was directed to passengers. A person attempting to enter a vehicle must intend to enter it as a passenger. The claimant was trying to remove the occupants or prevent the vehicle from being driven away. He was not attempting to enter as a passenger.

4. Nor was the claimant “carried” by the vehicle in the relevant sense when he was dragged beneath it. Section 145(4A) contemplated being carried in the normal manner as a passenger, not being taken along by a moving vehicle during an injury.

5. The statutory scheme did not adopt a general “cover-all” approach to injuries arising from vehicle use. The enacted exclusions had to be applied according to their terms. Since the claimant’s injuries were required to be covered under section 145, section 151 made the insurers liable as if the policy insured the driver.