Jones & Anor v Norfolk County Council

A special educational needs statement must identify provision with sufficient specificity and clarity to show what has been decided. It must not delegate the statutory decision to another body or use language so vague that the provision cannot be discerned. The required degree of detail is context-sensitive. Flexibility may be appropriate where a child has been out of school and the statement sets a minimum level of provision. A tribunal must also address material expert evidence that conflicts with the evidence it accepts. A bare reference to a report is not necessarily fatal, but failure to engage with materially different expert opinions may render the decision unsustainable.

The parents appealed against a decision of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal concerning their son’s statement of special educational needs. The Tribunal had rejected their challenge to Norfolk County Council’s proposed placement of the child at a mainstream primary school rather than an independent specialist school. The appeal raised issues about the Tribunal’s treatment of expert evidence, an erroneous reference to autism-related matters, the specificity and flexibility of the educational provision, and whether the statement unlawfully deprived the parents of a further right of appeal.

1. The appeal succeeded in part. The Tribunal’s decision was quashed on the grounds that it failed to address materially relevant evidence from three expert witnesses concerning whether a specialist placement was required. The Tribunal had relied on the evidence of the proposed school’s senior teacher, but did not explain why it rejected the contrary opinions of the parents’ experts.
2. The Tribunal was entitled to assess the credibility and competence of the school’s witness and to conclude that the parents’ objections were more ideological than educational. That conclusion did not remove the need to engage with the expert evidence supporting a specialist placement.
3. A statement of special educational needs must be specific, detailed and quantified. It must make clear what provision has been decided and cannot delegate the statutory duty to another person or body. However, the degree of particularity is context-sensitive. The statement may allow appropriate flexibility and need not specify every detail where the circumstances justify a minimum requirement.
4. The provision requiring a minimum of 10 diagnostic teaching sessions, weekly training for a teaching assistant, at least 25 hours of individual support in specified settings, and later review was sufficiently flexible in the circumstances. The child had been absent from school for a substantial period, and the minimum provision protected the parents’ position. The provision did not deprive them of a right of appeal.
5. The Tribunal’s mistaken references to autistic spectrum disorder and Asperger’s syndrome did not affect its principal conclusion and could be corrected by deleting the erroneous passage. The challenge on that ground, and on the specificity and appeal-right grounds, therefore failed.
6. Submissions were invited on the form of the consequential order, particularly because a new statement had since been issued.

This was an appeal to the Administrative Court from the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal’s decision issued on 30 December 2005. The judgment does not state any further appellate history.