Amoako, R (on the application of) v Director of Public Prosecutions

For the purpose of the seven-day appeal period under section 26(4) of the Extradition Act 2003, the relevant day is the calendar day on which the order is pronounced. The fact that a magistrates’ court sits beyond ordinary office hours does not postpone the making of the order to the next business day. Procedural provisions concerning acts required to be done at a court office do not alter that statutory meaning. The deadline therefore expires seven days after, and including, the day on which the order is made, subject to the ordinary closing-time rules applicable on the final day. Legal certainty favours a fixed date determined by the pronouncement of the order, rather than an uncertain inquiry into the precise time at which the hearing ended.

The claimant sought to challenge the rejection by the court office of his notice of appeal as out of time. Extradition proceedings before a district judge at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court concluded on Friday 17 February 2006, when the extradition order was pronounced at about 6.15 pm. The claimant sought to lodge his notice of appeal on Friday 24 February 2006.

The central issue was whether section 26(4) of the Extradition Act 2003 treated the order as made on the Friday, or whether the late hour meant that it was made on the following Monday for the purposes of calculating the seven-day permitted period.

1. Application dismissed. The order was made on Friday 17 February 2006, when the district judge pronounced the extradition order. The notice lodged on Friday 24 February was therefore out of time.
2. Section 26(4) of the Extradition Act 2003 requires notice of appeal to be given within seven days starting with the day on which the order is made. In ordinary language, that is the day of pronouncement, not the next day on which the court office is open.
3. The fact that magistrates’ courts may sit beyond ordinary office hours does not alter the date on which a judicial order is made. Treating late orders as made on the next business day would create uncertainty by requiring inquiry into the precise time at which the judge pronounced the order or completed giving reasons.
4. Neither the Interpretation Act nor the procedural provisions displaced that ordinary meaning. Part 2 of the CPR did not define “day” as “business day”. Rule 2.8(5), concerning an act due at an office closed on the final day, addressed a different matter and could not modify the statutory period.
5. The seven-day period expired at the close of business on Thursday 23 February 2006. The court had no power to extend the statutory time limit. The suggestion that the issue warranted consideration by the House of Lords was rejected.

The judgment describes prior extradition proceedings before a district judge at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court. The Administrative Court determined the resulting procedural application concerning the time for lodging an appeal notice.