Armstrong v Times Newspapers Ltd

In determining the meaning of allegedly defamatory words, the court must identify the single natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader reading the publication once. The publication must be considered as a whole, including its headline, photographs and captions. The reader may read between the lines and engage in some loose thinking, but is neither naïve nor avid for scandal. The court must avoid over-elaborate textual analysis and should assess the overall impression. A publication may convey guilt rather than merely reasonable grounds for suspicion, even where it contains denials, unanswered questions and material capable of supporting innocence. The decisive question is the impression produced by the publication as a whole.

Lance Armstrong brought a libel claim against Times Newspapers Limited, David Walsh and Alan English concerning a Sunday Times article about allegations that he had used performance-enhancing drugs. The parties agreed that the article was defamatory, but disputed the level of meaning conveyed.

Armstrong alleged that the article meant he had taken drugs to enhance his cycling performance and was therefore a fraud, cheat and liar. The defendants contended that it conveyed only reasonable, or possibly strong, grounds for suspecting that conduct. By consent, the issue of meaning was ordered to be tried as a preliminary issue by a judge sitting alone. The central question was whether the article conveyed guilt or suspicion.

1. Approach to meaning. The court adopted the established approach stated in Skuse v. Granada Television Limited [1996] EMLR 278 and Gillick v. Brook Advisory Centres [2002] EWCA Civ 1263. The publication had to be given the natural and ordinary meaning it would convey to the ordinary reasonable reader reading it once. That reader was neither naïve nor unduly suspicious, could read between the lines and engage in some loose thinking, but was not avid for scandal.
2. The court was required to determine a single meaning, while avoiding an over-elaborate analysis. The article had to be read as a whole, with its bane and antidote taken together. The approach in Charman v. Orion Publishing Co. Ltd [2005] EWHC 2187 was treated as particularly relevant. The court also applied the principle illustrated by Chalmers v. Payne (1835) 2 Cr M & R 156 that the defamatory and mitigating material must be considered together.
3. The distinction between suspicion and guilt was material. Following Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234, suspicion of guilt could fall short of guilt, although loose discussion of suspicion might convey that the suspicion was well founded. The court therefore had to decide the overall impression rather than impose a rule that a statement of suspicion necessarily alleged guilt.
4. Reading the article once, together with its headline, photographs and captions, the ordinary reasonable reader would understand it to mean that Armstrong had taken drugs to enhance his cycling performance. It followed that his conduct was fraudulent and amounted to cheating, and that his denials were lies. The denials, references to unanswered questions and evidence that he had not failed relevant drug tests did not displace the overall impression created by the article.
5. The claimant’s meaning was upheld and the defendants’ proposed meaning was rejected. The preliminary issue was determined in favour of the claimant.

This was a first-instance determination of meaning as a preliminary issue. The judgment records that the issue was ordered by consent on 7 December 2005 to be tried by a judge sitting alone.