Barbara Rees Ltd v Cardiff County Council

Under the deemed-permission regime for advertisements, a sign changed from “To Let” to “Let By” may constitute prima facie evidence that a tenancy has been granted. The inference remains rebuttable by evidence showing that the tenancy was completed later.

Where section 224(6) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is relied on, the defendant bears the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that all reasonable steps were taken to secure removal of the advertisement. The assessment is fact-sensitive and may include the adequacy and frequency of instructions to contractors, periods of inactivity, legal advice, and contractual rights to remove signs.

Barbara Rees Ltd appealed by way of Case Stated against its conviction by Cardiff Magistrates’ Court on five counts of unlawfully displaying advertisements contrary to section 224 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, as amended by the Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005.

The advertisements concerned residential properties and remained displayed beyond the 14-day period following the grant of the relevant tenancies under Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 1992. The central issues were whether “Let By” signs were evidence that tenancies had been granted and whether the appellant had established the statutory defence of taking all reasonable steps to secure removal.

1. Appeal dismissed. The justices were entitled to find that changing a sign from “To Let” to “Let By” was prima facie evidence that a tenancy had been granted. “Let By” was an unqualified assertion which, in ordinary parlance, indicated that the premises had been let. The appellant remained entitled to adduce evidence rebutting that inference.
2. The wording concerning advertisements stating that a letting had been agreed or that premises had been let subject to contract did not prevent a “Let By” sign from being evidence of a granted tenancy. It merely recognised that those qualified statements could precede the grant of the tenancy.
3. The appellant bore the legal burden of establishing the section 224(6) defence on the balance of probabilities. The justices were entitled to consider all the evidence, including the appellant’s own evidence about its sign contractors.
4. The conclusion that all reasonable steps had not been taken was not perverse. Relevant matters included the unexplained inactivity between April and August, the absence of recorded action during that period, the failure to obtain independent legal advice, and the absence of any agreement showing that the appellant had secured rights to remove signs or take effective action against its contractors.
5. The court declined to give a definitive construction of “a tenancy is granted” because that issue did not arise for decision. It observed, obiter, that the latest possible date would be when the tenancy commenced, and that the phrase was apt to include the point when the parties and terms became sufficiently certain for a binding contract to exist. Signatures might, but need not, evidence that event.
6. The questions stated by the justices were answered “Yes” in relation to the burden under section 101 of the Magistrates Court Act 1980 and the findings concerning knowledge and reasonable steps.

• Cardiff Magistrates’ Court: convicted the appellant on five counts of unlawfully displaying advertisements.
• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal by way of Case Stated dismissed; the justices’ answers and conclusions upheld.