Hunt v Court At First Instance, Antwerp, Belgium

An extradition warrant under Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 must identify the provision of the requesting territory’s law under which the alleged conduct constitutes an offence. A warrant which fails to do so is not a Part 1 warrant and must be quashed. Passage of time may bar extradition where, assessed in the circumstances as a whole, extradition would be unjust or oppressive. Relevant considerations include culpable and unexplained delay, the requested person’s co-operation and resulting sense of security, the availability of safeguards in the requesting state, and serious consequences for family members.

The appellant challenged an order made by a district judge at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court directing his extradition to Belgium under a European arrest warrant concerning alleged money laundering between 1997 and 1998.

He argued that the warrant did not establish that he was accused of an offence, did not identify the relevant provisions of Belgian law, and that extradition was barred by delay under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003. The central questions were whether the warrant satisfied section 2 and whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time.

1. Appeal allowed. The European arrest warrant was quashed. The appellant’s extradition to Belgium in respect of the specified conduct and offences was declared barred by section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. The warrant sufficiently showed that the appellant was an accused person. Its wording, read with the order for arrest in absentia, the description of the alleged conduct and the absence of an executable sentence, established that it was accusatory rather than a warrant for execution of a sentence. Ground 1 therefore failed.
3. Section 2(4)(c) required the warrant to identify the provision of Belgian law under which the alleged conduct constituted an offence. The warrant described the conduct as money laundering and the proceeds of crime and stated the maximum sentence, but did not identify the relevant Belgian statutory provision or code. It therefore failed to comply with section 2 and was not a Part 1 warrant. Ground 2 succeeded.
4. In assessing section 14, the court could consider the risk of hardship or injustice where there was no information about how the requesting state would address an abuse of process argument. The court was entitled to examine the issue itself, having regard to the safeguards available in the requesting state.
5. The delay was unexplained and culpable. The appellant had co-operated by attending an interview, answering questions and offering a further interview, while the Belgian authorities knew where he was and gave no adequate explanation for the subsequent delay. That co-operation could reasonably have lulled him into a sense of security. The further delay caused by issuing a fresh warrant was also relevant.
6. The appellant’s changed personal circumstances, including his substantial caring responsibilities for his wife and the serious consequences extradition could have for her wellbeing and the family, supported the conclusion that extradition would be unjust and oppressive.
7. An order was made under section 61 of the Extradition Act 2003 for payment of £4,899.96 in costs from central funds.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the order of the district judge at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court was allowed. The European arrest warrant was quashed and extradition was declared barred.