Goodman v Goodman & Ors

Rectification of a duly executed will under section 20 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 requires proof, on the balance of probabilities, that the will fails to carry out the testator’s intentions because of a clerical error or a failure to understand instructions. The formal execution of the will creates a strong evidential presumption that it records the testator’s intentions, so convincing evidence is required to displace it. The relevant intention is the testator’s intention when the will was executed. Where the evidence shows that the drafter misunderstood instructions and included an additional testamentary benefit, the court may rectify the will by removing the erroneous provision.

The claimant sought rectification of her deceased husband’s will under section 20 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982. The will provided for a monthly payment to his father while the father occupied a specified property. The claimant contended that this provision was included because the solicitor misunderstood instructions intended to preserve an existing property and income arrangement, rather than to create an additional legacy. The first defendant opposed rectification. The issue was whether the statutory conditions for rectification were established by convincing evidence.

1. The claim for rectification succeeded. The court ordered the excision of clause 3 from the will.
2. Under section 20(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1982, the claimant bore the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that the will failed to carry out the testator’s intentions because of a clerical error or a failure to understand instructions. Because the will had been duly executed, there was a strong evidential bias in favour of its reflecting the testator’s intentions. Convincing evidence was therefore required to rebut that conclusion.
3. The relevant intention was the testator’s intention when he executed the will, rather than merely the intention communicated when instructions were initially given.
4. The evidence established that clause 3 was intended to preserve the existing arrangements concerning the property and was not intended to confer a separate legacy. The amount of the payment matched the net monthly benefit under those arrangements. The corresponding provision in the claimant’s will, the structure of the property provisions, the drafting history and the solicitor’s evidence all supported the conclusion that the drafter had misunderstood the instructions.
5. The existing contractual arrangements survived the testator’s death. The additional clause was therefore unnecessary and materially increased the burden on the estate. Its removal rectified the will so as to carry out the testator’s intentions.

Not stated in the judgment.