RJM, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

Article 14 of the ECHR requires differential treatment to be based on a personal characteristic or other status. Having accommodation, or being without accommodation, is not such a characteristic. Nor does it constitute a legal status comparable to nationality, domicile or property ownership.

Even if Article 14 is engaged, differences in social-security provision may be justified where they pursue legitimate aims of allocating finite resources and assisting vulnerable groups by other means. In that context, the legislature and executive enjoy a broad discretion, and withholding the disability premium from disabled persons without accommodation was not disproportionate.

RJM, a person with mental-health difficulties and incapable of work, received Income Support and the disability premium when accommodated. The premium was withheld during a period when he was without accommodation and sleeping rough, under the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987.

He sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to revise that decision. He alleged discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the ECHR, read with Article 1 of Protocol 1. The issues were whether being without accommodation constituted an Article 14 status and, if so, whether the difference in treatment was justified.

1. Article 14 status. The claim was dismissed because being without accommodation was not a personal characteristic for Article 14 purposes. The relevant distinction was between persons with and without accommodation during the period in question. Having or lacking accommodation was analogous to the historical circumstance considered in R(S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2004] 1 WLR 2196, rather than the continuing family relationship and obligations recognised in Francis v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 All ER 748 (paras [21]–[31]).
2. There was no legal status of residence or ordinary residence comparable to nationality or domicile, and no legal status of property ownership. RJM’s disability and incapacity for work were personal characteristics, but they did not explain the impugned distinction (para [30]–[31]).
3. Justification. Although the issue did not arise strictly after the status finding, the court considered it. Social and economic policy and the distribution of public resources attract substantial legislative and executive judgment, as recognised in R v DPP, ex p Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, R (Hooper) v Work and Pensions Secretary [2005] 1 WLR 1681 and R (Carson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] 2 WLR 1369.
4. The difference between accommodated and unaccommodated claimants was relevant because accommodation-related expenses differed, while the Secretary of State had legitimate aims of targeting finite resources and assisting homeless people through accommodation and other measures. The exclusion of the disability premium was not disproportionate, even if other social-policy experts regarded it as unfair (paras [32]–[39]).
5. The claim was dismissed on both grounds: Article 14 was not engaged, and, alternatively, the differential treatment was objectively and reasonably justified (para [40]).