Thomson v Church Commissioners for England & Anor

On an application requiring an Agricultural Lands Tribunal to state a case, the claimant must show a fairly arguable question of law arising from the tribunal’s decision. Whether the statutory livelihood condition is satisfied to a “material extent” under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 is ordinarily a question of assessment and fact. Percentages are useful guides, but they cannot create a rigid mathematical threshold. The tribunal must assess the extent of failure by considering both the time requirement and the value of the livelihood derived from the holding. A substantial shortfall may properly fail the materiality test. Eligibility, or treatment as an eligible person, must be established before the tribunal considers fairness, reasonableness or suitability.

The claimant sought a second succession tenancy of Ricknell Grange Farm after her brother’s death. The Agricultural Lands Tribunal found by a majority that she did not satisfy the requirement under s.36(3)(a) of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, or satisfy it to a material extent under s.41(1)(b). It therefore did not consider whether it would be fair and reasonable to permit the application, although it considered her suitable in principle.

The tribunal refused to state a case. The claimant applied under s.6(2) of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1954 for an order requiring it to do so. The central issue was whether any of the claimant’s proposed challenges disclosed a fairly arguable question of law.

1. Application dismissed. The claimant failed to identify a fairly arguable error of law justifying an order that the Agricultural Lands Tribunal state a case.
2. The statutory question whether the livelihood condition was satisfied to a material extent was a question of assessment, judgment and appreciation for the tribunal. It could involve secondary questions of fact derived from primary findings. The court could intervene for misdirection, failure to take account of material circumstances, or an irrational conclusion, but not merely because the tribunal’s rational assessment was said to be wrong.
3. The phrase “material extent” required a contextual assessment. Percentages were useful guides, but no mathematical cut-off could be imposed. The tribunal had to consider both the time and value elements, including the extent of the failure and whether the shortfall was substantial. The claimant had not reached the 50.1 per cent principal-source threshold in any relevant year, and the shortfall was consistently substantial rather than marginal.
4. Littlewood v Rolfe did not establish that any achievement exceeding 74 per cent of the statutory value threshold necessarily satisfied the materiality requirement. Its result depended on materially different facts, including periods when the livelihood was wholly or almost wholly derived from the holding.
5. The claimant’s eligibility had to be established before the tribunal could consider the fairness and reasonableness provision or suitability. The tribunal had therefore been entitled to stop after finding that s.41(1)(b) was not satisfied.

Not an appeal from a lower court decision. The application arose from the Agricultural Lands Tribunal’s refusal to state a case on 6 June 2005.