Mattu v University Hospitals Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust

A contractual disciplinary procedure governing NHS consultants must be followed according to its terms. At the sanction stage, the employer may rely only on facts found by the inquiry panel which relate to the charges, including necessary inferences. It may not introduce collateral matters or aggravating allegations, such as alleged dishonesty in giving evidence during the inquiry. The chief executive may assess the seriousness of proved misconduct and is not bound by the panel’s recommendation as to sanction. The full contractual range of sanctions remains available. A free-standing breakdown of trust and confidence cannot itself justify disciplinary action, although trustworthiness may be relevant when assessing proved dishonesty. The procedure should continue, subject to compliance with those limits.

Dr Mattu, a consultant employed by the Trust, was suspended while an inquiry panel investigated allegations of professional misconduct under the Trust’s contractual Medical & Dental Staff Disciplinary Procedure. The panel found him at fault in relation to pressure placed on research fellows and the backdating or fabrication of correspondence, but recommended a first written warning.

The chief executive proposed disciplinary proceedings in which dismissal remained possible. His proposed case included alleged lies or untrue evidence given by Dr Mattu during the inquiry and relied on matters said to aggravate the misconduct. Dr Mattu sought final injunctive relief to restrain the proposed process. The central issues were the matters which could lawfully be considered at the disciplinary stage and whether the chief executive was bound by the panel’s findings on fault or its recommended sanction.

1. Outcome. The application for injunctive relief was refused. The disciplinary procedure was to continue to its natural conclusion, provided it was conducted within the contractual framework and in accordance with the court’s rulings.
2. The panel’s findings of fact were binding. The chief executive could take account of findings on the charges, findings directly relevant to those charges, and necessary inferences from them. He could not rely on collateral or incidental findings unrelated to the charges, add a gloss to the panel’s findings, or make new findings of fact.
3. The disciplinary process concerned Dr Mattu’s alleged misconduct in 2001 and 2002. The chief executive could not treat alleged lying or untrue evidence given during the inquiry in 2005 as additional or aggravating misconduct. A conclusion equivalent to quasi-perjury would require separate proceedings with appropriate safeguards.
4. The chief executive was entitled to exercise his own judgment on the seriousness of the proved misconduct. The panel’s recommendation was a recommendation and did not bind him. He therefore had the full range of contractual sanctions available, including dismissal, provided that he considered the panel’s recommendation and underlying reasoning and relied only on permissible facts and matters.
5. The chief executive could not rely on a free-standing conclusion that trust and confidence had broken down. Consistently with Barros D’Sa v University Hospitals of Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust [2001] IRLR 691, the relevant consideration was the misconduct found proved under the contractual procedure. Trustworthiness could nevertheless be relevant when assessing a proved charge involving dishonesty, including the number and duration of such charges and any mitigation.
6. The express terms of the disciplinary procedure were sufficient to determine the dispute. It was therefore unnecessary to imply additional terms concerning trust and confidence or the conduct of the disciplinary hearing.