Ford Camber Ltd v Deanminster Ltd & Anor

The statutory power to override rights affecting land acquired for redevelopment may be exercised where the acquiring authority obtains the beneficial interest and the right to be registered as proprietor, even if registration is not completed before disposal to a successor in title. A transfer and re-transfer are not ineffective merely because the authority intends to hold the land briefly. The statutory authorisation extends to works carried out by a person deriving title from the authority. A challenge based on technical defects in the acquisition process must be brought promptly where delay causes prejudice, particularly where the relevant authority and its successors have been dissolved and documents or witnesses may no longer be available.

The claimant owned land benefiting from a right of way over the former Phoenix Brickworks site. The Land Authority for Wales acquired the site from Tesco, undertook to acquire or override the claimant’s rights, and transferred the site back to Tesco. The defendants later owned the relevant land and proposed works which would block the existing route while providing an alternative access.

The claimant sought permission to amend its particulars of claim to challenge the statutory basis and effectiveness of the 1995 transactions under the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980. The application followed disclosure concerning the transfers and the Authority’s resolutions. The central issues were whether the Authority had acquired the land within section 104, whether the transactions were genuine and authorised, and whether the proposed amendments were defeated by delay and prejudice.

1. Application refused. The proposed amendments had no reasonable prospect of success and were refused. The application was dismissed.
2. The Authority acquired the Phoenix site within section 104 of the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980. A registered title is not acquired by execution of the transfer alone, but the transferee obtains the beneficial interest and the right to registration. The Authority therefore acquired the entirety of the estate which Tesco could transfer, notwithstanding that it did not register the transfer before retransferring the site.
3. The obligation to retransfer the land and the fact that the Authority did not retain the purchase money did not prevent acquisition. The transactions could be challenged as a sham only if all parties shared a common intention that the documents should create an appearance of rights and obligations different from those actually intended. No such case was properly established.
4. Paragraph 7(1) of Schedule 20 authorised works on land acquired under section 104 where the works were carried out in accordance with planning permission, even if they interfered with an easement or other right affecting the land. The authorisation extended to works done by a person deriving title from the Authority. The Authority’s resolutions and agreement showed that it acquired the site for redevelopment and subsequent disposal to a successor in title.
5. The dispute was primarily a private-law challenge to whether the statutory powers had been effectively exercised, rather than a challenge to the lawfulness of the Authority’s decision on Wednesbury grounds. It could therefore have been brought in proceedings of this kind in 1995, although judicial review was also potentially available.
6. In any event, the delay caused clear prejudice. The Authority and its successors had been dissolved, documents might be lost, memories would fade, and later development and planning arrangements had occurred. The claimant had known enough in 1995 to challenge the process and had suffered no genuine loss because the proposed alternative access was no less convenient.