Scholes, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An inquest is ordinarily the means by which the State discharges its investigative obligation under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights following a death in custody. The obligation requires an effective investigation meeting minimum standards of independence, effectiveness, promptness, public scrutiny and next-of-kin participation. It does not ordinarily require a public inquiry into sentencing policy, broad government funding or resource allocation, even where a systemic problem is alleged. Separate investigations may be considered cumulatively where, taken together, they satisfy the Article 2 standards. A full and thorough inquest into the operational circumstances of a death discharged the obligation in this case.

Joseph Scholes, aged 16, died by suicide shortly after being placed in a young offenders institution. His mother sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to establish a public inquiry. The Secretary of State relied on the inquest, together with reviews by the Sentencing Guidelines Council, the Youth Justice Board and other bodies.

The claimant argued that Article 2 required investigation of the juvenile sentencing regime and the adequacy of custodial provision for vulnerable children. The central issue was whether the inquest, and the additional investigations, discharged the State’s procedural obligation under Article 2.

1. Application dismissed. The Secretary of State acted lawfully in refusing to establish a public inquiry.
2. Article 2 requires an effective investigation when a person dies in custody. The investigation must meet minimum standards concerning independence, effectiveness, reasonable promptness, public scrutiny and appropriate participation by the next of kin. Article 2 does not prescribe one particular investigative procedure. A properly conducted inquest will ordinarily discharge the obligation.
3. The inquest was exceptionally thorough. It examined the information available before sentence, the sentencing process, allocation and placement, the adequacy of information-sharing, the conditions at Stoke Heath, operational practices, the juvenile secure estate and the investigations conducted after Joseph’s death. The only matters materially outside its scope were juvenile sentencing policy and the financial resources available to the juvenile estate.
4. The authorities supported the conclusion that Article 2 did not require a public inquiry into broad policy issues, government funding or resource allocation. The alleged existence of a systemic problem did not alter that conclusion. The function of an inquest is to identify defects; responsibility for remedying them rests with the Government and relevant agencies.
5. The inquest, viewed alone, discharged the Article 2 obligation. Alternatively, the inquest together with the work of the Sentencing Guidelines Council and the Youth Justice Board satisfied the requirements. The Council’s independent and publicly scrutinised guideline process, and the opportunity for participation, were significant. The Youth Justice Board’s lack of institutional independence was not fatal when the overall investigation was considered.
6. The existence of a possible appeal against sentence did not itself discharge, or defeat, the Article 2 investigative obligation. Nor was the claimant barred because she had not challenged the Coroner’s interlocutory ruling before the inquest.

This was a first-instance judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to establish a public inquiry following the inquest into Joseph Scholes’s death.