Dunster Properties Ltd v First Secretary of State & Anor

Planning inspectors are not bound by an earlier inspector’s decision on a later application. They must, however, give intelligible and adequate reasons for the decision reached. The reasons must identify the planning considerations sufficiently clearly to enable an affected developer, or an unsuccessful objector, to understand the decision and assess the prospects of a different proposal. An inspector’s reasoning is not defective merely because it is expressed inelegantly or reaches a conclusion contrary to an earlier decision, provided the decision can be understood as a whole. Where the statutory scheme makes the inspector functus officio and gives the court only a power to quash, the court cannot obtain supplementary reasons by referring the decision back to the inspector.

Dunster Properties Ltd challenged the decision of a planning inspector, Mr Mead, dated 25 November 2005, dismissing its appeal against refusal of permission for a first-floor extension at 64/65 Glebe Place, Chelsea. An earlier inspector, Mr Sargent, had rejected a previous design because of its appearance but had not treated the principle of a first-floor extension as unacceptable. Mr Mead rejected the revised scheme because it would remove a gap and recessive view said to contribute to the character and appearance of the Cheyne Conservation Area.

The central issues were whether Mr Mead’s report gave adequate reasons, whether paragraph 8 created an unresolved inconsistency, and whether the court could seek supplementary reasons from the inspector.

1. Outcome. The challenge was dismissed. The inspector’s decision was not defective for want of reasons.
2. Adequacy of reasons. The court applied the principle that the question is whether the applicant was substantially prejudiced by the deficiency in the reasons. Reasons must be intelligible and adequate. In a planning case they should identify the considerations sufficiently clearly to allow a disappointed developer to assess the prospects of an alternative application. The same principle protects an unsuccessful objector’s understanding of the approach adopted.
3. Earlier decision. One inspector is not bound by an earlier inspector’s decision. The earlier report was nevertheless a material argument which Mr Mead had to address. His reference to having no comment on the earlier inspector’s view and on the council’s repeated in-principle objection was inelegant, but, read with his stated conclusions, it indicated that he had adopted the council’s position that the gap and recessive view should be preserved. The report therefore contained no mutual inconsistency and its reasoning was sufficiently clear.
4. Supplementary reasons. The court considered the procedure approved in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2409 and Barke v SEETEC Business Technology Centre Ltd [2005] ICR 1373. Such a course would have been desirable where available, but section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 left the inspector functus officio and gave the court only the power to quash. The court therefore could not invite or compel the inspector to supplement his reasons.
5. Order. The Secretary of State was awarded costs of £4,488.

Planning inspector: Mr Mead dismissed the appellant’s planning appeal on 25 November 2005.

High Court (Administrative Court): The court dismissed the statutory challenge and upheld the inspector’s decision.