Boulter v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor

An extradition appeal concerning medical condition will succeed only where extradition would breach the appellant’s human rights. The Secretary of State’s statutory role under the Extradition Act 2003 is limited, but he must comply with the Human Rights Act. Article 3 is engaged by exceptionally severe circumstances, such as removal to a place where essential treatment is unavailable and death would follow in distressing conditions. The availability of appropriate medical facilities and safeguards in the receiving state is highly material. Article 8 ordinarily requires circumstances approaching the seriousness of an Article 3 breach before extradition will be disproportionate. Strict statutory appeal time limits may be extended only where the interests of justice clearly require it.

The appellant faced extradition to Canada following fraud charges and breach of Canadian bail. A District Judge rejected his contention that his physical and mental condition made extradition unjust or oppressive. The Secretary of State subsequently ordered extradition under section 93 of the Extradition Act 2003.

The appellant appealed under section 108, relying principally on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention and seeking to raise further medical evidence and challenge the District Judge’s decision out of time. The central issues were whether time should be extended, whether the appeal could properly concern the Secretary of State’s decision, and whether extradition would breach the appellant’s human rights.

1. Applications to amend and adjourn. The application to amend the appeal so as to challenge the District Judge’s decision was refused. Although the court might possess power to extend the statutory time limit, it could be exercised only where the interests of justice clearly required it. The appellant had representation for a substantial period and had opportunities to obtain advice and seek the necessary amendment earlier.
2. The adjournment application was also refused. Historical information from Canada would not assist in deciding whether return at the present time would breach human rights. Medical facilities were available in custody, and the evidence did not establish an urgent need for further reports before the appeal could be determined.
3. Under the Extradition Act 2003, medical condition and whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive are matters for the court, not matters which the Secretary of State may directly reconsider after the court has found extradition permissible. The Secretary of State’s statutory decision was subject to the Human Rights Act and could not direct extradition if that would breach Convention rights.
4. The Article 3 argument failed. D v United Kingdom concerned removal of a person with AIDS to a country where essential treatment was unavailable and death in particularly distressing conditions was anticipated. Canada had appropriate medical facilities, safeguards to prevent an unfit person being tried, and arrangements for medical care during transit. The present case therefore fell far short of the exceptional circumstances required.
5. The Article 8 argument also failed. The Strasbourg jurisprudence indicated that circumstances would ordinarily need to be almost as serious as an Article 3 breach before extradition could be regarded as disproportionate. The appeal had no reasonable prospect of success and was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal under section 108 of the Extradition Act 2003 against the Secretary of State’s extradition decision.
• District Judge: rejected the appellant’s medical-condition objection and sent the matter to the Secretary of State. No citation for that decision is stated in the judgment.