Sunderland Housing Company Ltd & Anor v Baines& Ors

Interim relief restraining publication of defamatory material requires careful reconciliation of freedom of expression with reputation and privacy. A defendant resisting an injunction on the basis of justification should identify the defamatory meaning or meanings intended to be justified and verify a genuine belief in their truth. A bare or blanket intention to justify is insufficient where allegations are numerous and grave. Evidence of a proposed defence is not necessarily required. The Bonnard v Perryman principle may prevail once a real issue suitable for trial has been identified, but it does not require an injunction to be refused while the alleged justification remains vague. Interim harassment relief may properly be confined to anonymous communications where that is the distinctive source of distress.

The claimants sought interim relief arising from a prolonged website campaign containing allegations of corruption, sexual misconduct and other wrongdoing. The claims included defamation, harassment, data protection and Norwich Pharmacal relief. The first claimant was a corporate entity, while the second claimant, Mr Walls, was an individual; the court treated their positions separately.

The court considered applications against identified defendants, unidentified website publishers, and respondents from whom information was sought. The central issues were whether publication should be restrained despite an asserted intention to plead justification, whether anonymous communications constituted an appropriate form of harassment to restrain, whether personal-data processing should be restrained, and whether information should be disclosed subject to the protection of sources.

1. Interim publication injunction. The injunction against Mr Baines was continued. A defendant resisting an injunction on the basis of justification must identify the defamatory meaning or meanings which he intends to justify and provide a witness statement verified by a statement of truth confirming his belief in their truth. A blanket assertion of an intention or hope to justify is insufficient, particularly where the allegations are numerous, serious and vague. The defendant need not produce cogent evidence establishing the strength of the proposed defence. The injunction could be revisited if the minimum requirements were later met.
2. The principle in Bonnard v Perryman remained important, but it did not automatically require refusal of relief before a genuine issue fit for trial had emerged. The court was also required to take account of Article 8 interests where engaged; Article 10 did not automatically prevail.
3. Harassment. Restraining anonymous publication was reasonable and proportionate against the background of continuing harassment. Relief was granted against Mr Baines, Mr Smith and the unidentified persons responsible for the relevant websites and publications.
4. Data protection and preservation. A temporary order restraining the processing of personal data was made against Mr Baines, with liberty to apply to discharge it. An order preserving documents was also made. Relief restraining defamation and data processing was confined to Mr Walls and was not granted for the corporate claimant.
5. Other defendants and disclosure. Suspicion alone did not justify interim relief against the second and fourth defendants where their denials could not properly be rejected as dishonest on paper. Norwich Pharmacal relief was granted against the remaining respondents. Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act might protect a source in a particular case, but it did not automatically invalidate the information order. Any source-protection objection should be raised when the risk actually arose.