Director of Public Prosecutions v Milton

Dangerous driving is assessed by a wholly objective standard. The driver’s intention, confidence or driving skill cannot introduce a subjective element into the test. However, circumstances within the accused’s knowledge may be relevant under section 2A(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, provided the statutory test remains objective.

Excessive speed alone does not automatically constitute dangerous driving. The tribunal of fact must assess speed in the context of the road, traffic, visibility, hazards, warning given to other road users and all other relevant circumstances. The court should not impose a fixed speed threshold.

A police advanced driver was acquitted by a district judge of dangerous driving and five alternative speeding offences arising from very high-speed driving while practising in an unfamiliar police vehicle. The district judge relied on the driver’s skill, the good conditions, the relative absence of traffic and the absence of actual danger to other road users. He also held that the driving was for police purposes within section 87 of the relevant road traffic legislation.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated. The central issues were whether the dangerous-driving test had been applied subjectively, whether speed alone could establish dangerous driving, and whether the police-purpose exemption applied to the speeding offences.

1. Dangerous driving. The statutory test under sections 2 and 2A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is wholly objective. The district judge was wrong to the extent that he took the respondent’s own assessment of his driving skill into account as introducing a subjective element. It was irrelevant that the respondent intended to drive as he did or believed that his skill made the driving safe.
2. The court left open whether knowledge of exceptional driving skill could, in an appropriate case, be treated as a circumstance within the accused’s knowledge under section 2A(3). The issue had not been adequately argued and was unnecessary to the decision.
3. The district judge failed to assess the driving adequately. He did not properly consider the video evidence, the nature of the roads, the hazards at particular stretches, stopping distances, the absence of warning to other road users, or the different speeds and settings involved. He relied impermissibly on witnesses’ opinions that the driving was not dangerous. Driving at the speeds alleged, without warning to other road users, raised a prima facie case requiring proper consideration.
4. The court rejected the proposed rule that driving at twice the speed limit must automatically amount to dangerous driving. Speed alone is insufficient; the question is speed in the context of all the circumstances. No fixed multiplier of the speed limit should be treated as dangerous driving per se.
5. The appeal was therefore allowed. The questions concerning police purposes were treated as obiter because the appeal was decided on the dangerous-driving issue. The section 87 exemption would nevertheless have required separate consideration for each offence. Whether it applied was a question of fact and degree, depending on the instructions given and the findings made. The matter was remitted to the Ludlow Magistrates’ Court for rehearing by a differently constituted tribunal. No costs were sought.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the Director of Public Prosecutions’ appeal by case stated against the district judge’s acquittals and remitted the matter for rehearing.
• Ludlow Magistrates’ Court: dismissed the dangerous-driving and speeding charges on 18 May 2005.