M v Inner London Crown Court

Where bail is refused to a 15- or 16-year-old, the court must apply the modified statutory scheme governing remand accommodation. The court must identify whether the statutory conditions for secure accommodation, a remand centre or prison are met, and must consult the specified youth justice or welfare authorities before making the relevant declarations. The modified Children and Young Persons Act 1969 should be read as retaining the reference to the conditions in section 23(5AA). Procedural failures in applying section 23 may nevertheless afford no practical basis for relief where, on the evidence, the statutory conclusion and accommodation decision were inevitable.

M, aged 16, faced trial for attempted robbery. The Inner London Crown Court refused bail and remanded him to Feltham Young Offenders Institution. An earlier failure to consider section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 had led the High Court to remit the matter for reconsideration. On reconsideration, the Crown Court again refused bail and ordered detention in secure accommodation after hearing from a Youth Offending Team officer.

M sought judicial review, alleging inadequate consultation, incorrect application of the statutory criteria, failure to separate the Bail Act and section 23 questions, and failure to state and explain the relevant statutory opinion. The central issue was whether the Crown Court had lawfully applied the modified section 23 regime and, if not, whether relief should follow.

1. Application refused. The Crown Court’s decision to refuse bail was not vulnerable to judicial review. In light of M’s recent offending, including offending while on bail, the judge was entitled to conclude under the Bail Act that M was likely to commit further offences if released.
2. After refusing bail, the judge had to apply section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. The statutory sequence required consideration of local authority accommodation, secure accommodation, a remand centre or prison, according to the conditions in section 23(4), (5), (5A) and (5AA).
3. The modified provisions applicable to boys aged 15 or 16 were confused and appeared potentially incomplete. Reading the legislation as a whole, including section 130 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, section 23(5) had to be construed as incorporating the conditions in section 23(5AA). The reference was part of Parliament’s intended scheme and was not confined to cases involving protection from serious harm.
4. The court accepted that the statutory procedure required consultation before determining the need for secure accommodation. The submissions that the judge had consulted too late, had conflated the bail and remand questions, and had failed to comply with the duty to state and explain the relevant opinion under section 23 had force.
5. Nevertheless, relief was refused. Given M’s offending record and offending while on bail, the Youth Offending Team officer’s evidence, and the circumstances existing by March 2006, it was inevitable that proper consideration would have led to the conclusion that secure accommodation was necessary. Lord Justice Latham agreed with the judgment.

• High Court (Administrative Court): An earlier habeas corpus application was treated as a judicial review claim and remitted to the Inner London Crown Court for reconsideration under section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. Permission was initially refused on the papers, then renewed. The present court refused the renewed application for review.