Mear & Ors v Cambridgeshire County Council

A definitive map and statement is conclusive evidence of the rights recorded in it, subject to the statutory challenge procedure. Once an unchallenged definitive map modification order has conclusively recorded a route as a bridleway, the court may declare that status and protect the public right of passage. An earlier interim order may be revisited where the factual and statutory position has materially changed. Where the status of another route as a vehicular highway remains disputed and the relevant administrative determination is not binding, final relief should not be granted summarily. Pending trial, the court must balance the landowner’s operational and safety concerns against the public’s right to unobstructed passage.

The claimants owned Wood Farm and disputed the public status of tracks and gates crossing their land. The Council asserted that the Red Land was a public vehicular highway and that the Yellow Land was a public bridleway. It sought declarations and orders requiring the removal or modification of gates erected across the routes.

An earlier interlocutory order made by HH Judge Richard Seymour QC proceeded on the basis that the routes were footpaths pending public-inquiry decisions. Subsequent definitive map modification orders deleted the footpath designation on the Red Land and recorded the Yellow Land as a four-metre bridleway. The claimants did not challenge those orders under Schedule 15, paragraph 12 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. The issues were whether the interim order should be varied, whether the Yellow Land should be declared a bridleway, and what interim relief should be granted concerning the Red Land and Gates 1 and 3.

1. Yellow Land. The confirmed definitive map modification order conclusively established the Yellow Land as a bridleway under section 56(1)(b) of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. The court therefore declared it to be a bridleway.
2. Gate 2 was an obstruction of the bridleway. The claimants were ordered to remove it and ensure an unobstructed bridleway four metres wide at that point.
3. The inspector’s conclusion that the Red Land was a public vehicular highway was not binding. The statutory procedure for recording rights of way did not finally determine that issue. Nevertheless, the inspector’s findings, the documentary evidence and the subsequent statutory history provided a very strong case that the Red Land was highway. The issue remained suitable for trial, particularly because further factual and expert evidence might be relevant.
4. The court was entitled to revisit Judge Seymour’s interim order because the position had materially changed. The Yellow Land’s bridleway status was now conclusive, while the expectation that all issues would be determined through the public inquiry had been mistaken.
5. Applying the balance of convenience, the public interest in exercising bridleway rights outweighed the claimants’ concerns about horse security, infection, public safety and farm security to the extent necessary to remove the stop at Gate 1. Gates 1 and 3 were permitted to remain until trial or further order. The court reserved further argument concerning spring tension and a possible bridle latch.
6. The remaining issues concerning the Red Land and the permissibility of Gate 3 were to proceed to trial, with the matter transferred to the Central London County Court for early case management.

First-instance decision. The judgment records an earlier interlocutory order by HH Judge Richard Seymour QC, made on February 20, 2003, which was varied in part in light of subsequent statutory proceedings.