Q, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Depatment & Anor

Detention pending deportation remains lawful where it is genuinely directed to removal and has not exceeded the period reasonably necessary for that purpose. The court must make a case-sensitive value judgment, considering all the circumstances, including the length and effects of detention, the prospects of removal, the detainee’s conduct, the risk of absconding or offending, and national security. Delay by a foreign authority does not automatically make detention unlawful. The court must assess whether the removal process has stalled or retains realistic momentum.

Q was detained pending deportation to Algeria under Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971. He challenged the continuation of his detention by habeas corpus and judicial review, arguing that the United Kingdom authorities had delayed or mishandled the identity-verification process and that the detention had become excessive. The Algerian authorities had not completed verification, but recent steps, including DNA matching, offered a prospect of early resolution. The central issue was whether detention remained reasonably required to secure removal.

1. The claims were dismissed. Q’s detention had not yet become unlawful.
2. The lawfulness of detention pending deportation requires a case-sensitive value judgment taking account of all the circumstances. The detention must remain for the purpose of removal and be limited to the period reasonably necessary for that purpose. Relevant considerations include its length and effects, the likelihood of absconding or offending, willingness to accept voluntary repatriation, the cause of the detention, the prospects of removal and national security.
3. The relevant period was principally the six to seven months after Q withdrew his deportation appeal. Before then, the Secretary of State could not know whether deportation would proceed. After withdrawal, the United Kingdom authorities had consistently urged the Algerian authorities to complete verification and supplied information requested from time to time.
4. The Algerian delay did not make detention unlawful in the circumstances. There was no evidence of bad faith, Q’s extensive use of aliases materially complicated verification, and DNA matching created a real possibility of early resolution. The process therefore retained momentum, unlike the stalled processes considered in R v Governor of Durham Prison, ex p Hardial Singh and In re Mahmod.
5. National security was an important consideration because of the serious risk if Q absconded, although it was not automatically predominant. Habeas corpus and judicial review were not ideal remedies for assessing the continuing lawfulness of detention in circumstances requiring potentially stringent control conditions. The alternative bail remedy under Schedule 3 was not decided because the substantive claims failed.