General Medical Council v Hiew

When deciding whether to extend an interim order suspending a doctor’s registration, the court must exercise its own judgment. It is not required to endorse the regulator’s requested period as a matter of course. A pending prosecution against another person does not, without more, justify a lengthy extension. The regulator must explain why its own fitness-to-practise case cannot proceed on the evidence already available. Previous delay and the resulting duration of suspension are important considerations. The court may grant a shorter extension where further time is justified, while requiring the regulatory proceedings to progress without avoidable delay.

The General Medical Council applied under section 41 A(6) of the Medical Act 1983 for a further 12-month extension of an interim order suspending Dr Hiew’s registration. The order had been maintained at successive reviews since April 2005. Criminal allegations against Dr Hiew had not led to charges, while a related prosecution against another doctor was expected to proceed in early 2007. The GMC said that it needed the police and CPS material before listing fitness-to-practise proceedings. The central issue was whether the court should extend the suspension for the requested period.

1. The application was granted under section 41 A(6) of the Medical Act 1983, but only for six months, from 21 October 2006 to 20 April 2007. There was no order as to costs.

2. The court was not required simply to endorse the Interim Orders Panel’s decision or the GMC’s requested extension. The statutory structure required an independent judicial assessment, particularly where allegations had been outstanding for more than two years and suspension had already continued for 18 months.

3. The court declined to determine that there was no case to answer. The material placed before it did not justify overturning the experienced assessment of the Interim Orders Panel, and the court had not been asked to examine all the evidence in detail.

4. A prosecution against another doctor was not a satisfactory basis for extending Dr Hiew’s suspension for 12 months. If the available witness statements supported interim suspension, the regulatory case should be capable of being brought to hearing independently of the related prosecution. The GMC’s listing pressures and the anticipated delay in receiving documents did not justify extending the suspension to more than three years from the first allegations.

5. The court considered that some further time was justified, but limited the extension to six months. The GMC was expected to progress the fitness-to-practise proceedings during that period.